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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in neuroscience allow marketing research-
ers to watch our brains react to advertisements and observe not
only our conscious thought process in response to an advertise-
ment, but also how our subconscious processes an advertisement.'
With this window into our minds, neuromarketing research allows
companies to tailor advertisements to elicit reactions we may not
* Marisa E. Main, Judicial Law Clerk, United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky; B.A. 2007, the Ohio State University; J.D. 2011, University of Akron
School of Law. The author would like to thank her wonderfully supportive family, especial-
ly her husband, Brett Versen, for his unwavering love and patience, her mother, Mary Ann
Palmer, for her endless strength and support, Dalton Main for his good-heartedness, Anna
Palmer for her exceptional insight, her father, Charles Main, and her stepfather, Dan
Palmer. The author also thanks Professor Jane C. Moriarty for this opportunity and help-
ful comments on an earlier draft, and Sara Radcliffe for her invaluable research assistance.
1. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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even be aware of, and in turn, manipulate our decision-making
processes.2 While this may sound like something out of a science
fiction film, it may be much closer to reality than almost anyone is
aware.
The use of neuroscience in advertising raises the legal issue of
whether the government can and should be able to regulate it un-
der the commercial speech doctrine. Using neuromarketing to
manipulate consumers is in opposition to every justification or
policy reason for granting First Amendment protection to com-
mercial speech, and for protecting the freedom of speech in gen-
eral. The manipulation of consumers through neuromarketing
does not promote informed decision-making by consumers or as-
sist in discovering the truth.
In this article, I analyze the current state of the commercial
speech doctrine and the constitutionality of potential government
regulations of neuromarketing. I discuss the potential constitu-
tionality of a complete ban of neuromarketing. I also consider the
constitutionality of a regulation requiring advertisers to include a
warning that alerts consumers when advertisements have been
created using neuromarketing techniques. Last, I review an ap-
plication of the commercial speech doctrine to a potential govern-
ment regulation of neuromarketing that promotes harmful prod-
ucts, considering a revival of the "greater-power-includes-the-
lesser-power" principle in this context.
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . ."' Today, the four-part test laid out
by the United States Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York governs
the constitutionality of any government regulation of commercial
speech.4 This test was only fairly recently formulated and adopted
by the Court, because historically, commercial speech did not re-
ceive First Amendment protection. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, in
1942, the United States Supreme Court stated, "the Constitution
imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely com-
2. See infra notes 102, 109 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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mercial advertising,"' in sustaining a New York City ban on ad-
vertisements in the street.6
It was not until 1976 that the Court afforded commercial speech
any protection under the First Amendment, with its decision in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.7 In holding void a statute that prohibited pharma-
cists from advertising prescription drug prices, the Court conclud-
ed:
Our question is whether speech which does no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction, is so removed from any exposi-
tion of ideas, and from truth, science, morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the admin-
istration of Government, that it lacks all protection. Our an-
swer is that it is not.'
The Court gave brief justifications for providing First Amendment
protection to commercial speech.9 First, the Court stated that the
information pharmacists would provide to customers about drug
prices is valuable to them and that in regard to drug prices, a con-
sumer's "interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate.""0
The second justification provided by the Court was that there
was First Amendment value in commercial speech, because society
5. 316 U.S. 52, 54(1942).
6. Id. at 55. The regulation seems almost laughable today, as it sought to prevent the
distribution of "any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising matter
whatsoever" in New York City. Id. at 53 n.1. Yet, the Court stated that the city was enti-
tled to prohibit the pursuit of business and advertisement in the streets if it deemed it an
'undesirable invasion of, or interference with, the full and free use of the highways by the
people in fulfillment of the public use to which streets are dedicated." Id. at 54-55. One
can only imagine how the city and Court of that era would react to the Times Square of
today.
7. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
8. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
9. These justifications provided for granting commercial speech protection under the
First Amendment do not necessarily fit with the broader justifications for protecting the
freedom of speech in general. Those justifications generally include the following: freedom
of speech is necessary for self-governance and an effective democracy; freedom of speech is
essential for the discovery of the truth, because truth is best discovered in a "marketplace
of ideas" where ideas can clash; freedom of speech is an essential aspect of personhood and
autonomy; and freedom of speech is integral to developing tolerance of the viewpoints of
others. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2
(3d ed. 2006).
10. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-764 ("When drug prices vary as strik-
ingly as they do, information as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience.
It could mean alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.").
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has a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information."
The Court stated, "[slo long as we preserve a predominately free
enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large meas-
ure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggre-
gate, be intelligent and well informed." 2 The Court then reasoned
that the free flow of commercial information is "indispensable to
the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise," and there-
fore, also "indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as
to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.""3
However, the Court did not afford commercial speech full First
Amendment protection.'4 Instead, the Court stated that there ex-
ists "commonsense differences between speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties" that
might not "justify the conclusion that commercial speech is value-
less, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, . . .
[but] nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is
necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate com-
mercial information is unimpaired."'" The Court distinguished
commercial speech from other types of speech, singling it out for
lesser protection, on two bases. 6 First, "the truth of commercial
speech may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator . . . in
that ordinarily, the advertiser seeks to disseminate information
about a specific product or service that he himself provides and
presumably knows more about than anyone else." 7 Second, the
Court considered commercial speech to be "more durable than oth-
er kinds," being the "[sline qua non of commercial profits," such
that "there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regula-
tion and forgone entirely.""
The Court listed several limitations on the First Amendment
protection it had granted to commercial speech, which included:
no protection for advertisements for illegal transactions; no pro-
tection for factually false or misleading advertisements; and that
commercial speech may be subject to prior restraints.' 9 Ultimate-
11. Id. at 764.
12. Id. at 765.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 772 n.24 (internal citations omitted).






ly, with this decision, the Court anointed commercial speech with
the protection of the First Amendment, but to a lesser degree.
That level of protection was fleshed out four years later in Central
Hudson v. Public Service Commission of New York.2"
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court adopted a four-part
analysis for determining the constitutionality of regulations of
commercial speech.2 The facts of Central Hudson involved the
Public Service Commission enacting a ban on promotional adver-
tising designed to stimulate demand for electricity.22 The Public
Service Commission hoped to prevent an increased demand for
electricity because of recent severe fuel shortages.23 In holding
that the ban was invalid, the Court applied a four-part analysis
for regulations of commercial speech:
At the outset we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful ac-
tivity and not be misleading. Next, we must ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquir-
ies yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest as-
serted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest.
24
The Court again noted that because of "the 'commonsense' distinc-
tion between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,
and other varieties of speech," the Constitution "accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech."2' The Court's asserted reason
for providing any protection to commercial speech was that it
serves the economic interest of the speaker and consumer, further-
ing "the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information."26
Central Hudson was not a unanimous decision though, and in a
lengthy dissent, Justice Rehnquist warned that the decision
"fail[ed] to give due deference to this subordinate position of com-
20. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
21. Id. at 566.
22. Id. at 559-60.
23. Id. at 559.
24. Id. at 566.
25. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
26. Id. at 561-62.
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mercial speech," returning to the "bygone era of Lochner v. New
York, in which it was common practice for this Court to strike
down economic regulations adopted by a State ... .2  Rehnquist
asserted that "[he] thought by now it had become well established
that a State had broad discretion in imposing economic regula-
tions."28 Rehnquist argued against the Court's rationale for af-
fording protection to commercial speech, stating that "[tihe notion
that more speech is the remedy to expose falsehood and fallacies is
wholly out of place in the commercial bazaar, where if applied log-
ically the remedy of one who was defrauded would be merely a
statement, available upon request, reciting the Latin maxim '[ca-
veat emptor."'29 He continued by stating that "in a democracy,
the economic is subordinate to the political, a lesson that our an-
cestors learned long ago, and that our descendants will undoubt-
edly have to relearn many years hence." °
Though the majority were unmoved by Justice Rehnquist's ar-
gument in Central Hudson, he succeeded, in 1986, in persuading
the Court to remit some of the protections afforded commercial
speech in the case of Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico.3 In Posadas, the Court sustained a reg-
ulation restricting advertising of casino gambling, enacted in or-
der to reduce demand for gambling, because of a concern for public
health, safety, and welfare. The Court focused on prongs three
and four of the Central Hudson test, finding that the legislature's
conclusion that advertising bans would reduce resident gambling
was "reasonable."33 The Court reasoned that because Puerto Rico
27. Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court
held that a New York statute setting a limit on the number of hours bakery employees
could work each week was unconstitutional. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
28. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 598. "Caveat Emptor" translates to "let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 252 (9th ed. 2009).
30. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 599 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
32. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
33. Id. at 342. Further, the Court seemingly reduced the last two steps of the analysis
to one of"fit." The Court stated that "[t]he last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis
basically involve a consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends." Id. at 341. This was subsequently confirmed and the
Supreme Court later explained this "fit" requirement by stating that it:
[Is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served; that em-
ploys not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it in the other
contexts... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.
610 Vol. 50
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had the greater power to completely ban casino gambling, it nec-
essarily had the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gam-
bling.34 Delivering the opinion of the Court, Rehnquist noted that
"it is precisely because the government could have enacted a
wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permis-
sible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing
the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on ad-
vertising."35 Thus, the Court seemed to adopt a vice exception to
the protection of commercial speech. This vice exception was reit-
erated in 1993, in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. ,36 before
being eventually denounced in 1996, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island.37
In Edge Broadcasting, the Supreme Court upheld a statute pro-
hibiting the radio broadcast of lottery advertising by licensees lo-
cated in non-lottery states.38  The Court stated that "the activity
underlying the relevant advertising-gambling-implicates no
constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category of
'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned alto-
gether."39 As in Posadas, the Court held that it was reasonable for
Congress to find a connection between advertising and demand,
and choose to advance its policy of decreasing demand for gam-
bling through the regulation of advertising for it.40
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 218 (2003) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). See also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476, 486 (1995).
34. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
35. Id. at 346.
36. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
37. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). There is still an exception for advertisements of activity that
is actually illegal. The Court has stated that such an exception exists consistently, without
much explanation. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 11.3.7.4. The only Supreme Court case
considering an advertisement of illegality is Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The Court found help-wanted advertisements
listed in columns that were titled "Jobs-Male Interest," "Jobs-Female Interest," and "Male-
Female," were unconstitutional, holding that '[d]iscrimination in employment is not only
commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance. We have no
doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing
a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes .... The illegality in this case may be less overt,
but we see no difference in principle here." Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388. Thus, the
cases seemingly turn on whether or not the underlying harmful conduct is in fact made
illegal by government regulation.
38. 509 U.S. at 436.
39. Id. at 426.
40. Id. at 434. The Court also reasoned that advertisement of the activity was not
required to be banned in its entirety, but that lesser forms of regulation were legitimate,
stating "[nior do we require that the Government make progress on every front before it
can make progress on any front." Id.
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However, in 44 Liquormart, the Court unanimously held uncon-
stitutional a Rhode Island statute prohibiting the advertisement
of liquor prices.4" In a portion of the plurality opinion joined by
three justices, Justice Stevens called the Court's previous Posadas
decision "erroneous." Stevens reasoned that "the 'greater-
includes-the-lesser' argument should be rejected for the additional
and more important reason that it is inconsistent with both logic
and well-settled doctrine."42 Citing a fishing proverb, Stevens
stated that it is "quite clear that banning speech may sometimes
prove far more intrusive than banning conduct."43 Stevens con-
cluded that the power to ban activity is not necessarily "greater"
than the power to suppress speech about it.' Stevens relied on
the text of the First Amendment, which he argued presumes that
attempted regulation of speech is more dangerous than attempted
regulation of conduct, and that this notion is in accordance with
"the essential role that the free flow of information plays in a
democratic society."45 In a separate opinion, Justice Thomas wrote
that "[iun cases such as this, in which the government interest is to
keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to ma-
nipulate their choices in the marketplace ... such an 'interest' is
per se illegitimate."46 Therefore, a majority of the Court over-
turned any vice exception in the commercial speech doctrine.
In a more recent, 2002 decision, Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center, the Supreme Court reiterated its rationale for af-
fording First Amendment protection to commercial speech and
recognized the continuing vitality of the Central Hudson four-part
analysis, despite several members of the Court having expressed
doubt as to its applicability in particular cases.47 The rationale
41. 517 U.S. at 516.
42. Id. at 511.
43. Id. The proverb cited was "give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a
man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 512.
46. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
47. 535 U.S. 357, 366-68 (2002). The Court cites several cases as examples of justices
questioning the Central Hudson analysis, including Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc.
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("I continue
to adhere to my view that in cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest
is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in
the marketplace, the Central Hudson test should not be applied because such an interest is
per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of commercial speech than it can
justify regulation of noncommercial speech." (internal quotations omitted)); 44 Liquormart,
517 U.S. at 500 n.10, 501, 510-14 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg,
Vol. 50612
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put forth for the continued protection of commercial speech in-
volved the "public interest that economic decisions ... be intelli-
gent and well-informed," a "particular consumer's interest in the
free flow of commercial information," and that "the commercial
marketplace . . . provides a forum where ideas and information
flourish."' The case involved a provision of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997,"9 which sought to pre-
vent the makers of "compound drugs" from advertising or promot-
ing the drugs.5" The Court struck down the provision as unconsti-
tutional, applying the Central Hudson analysis and focusing pri-
marily on the fourth prong of the analysis, which requires that the
speech restrictions not be more restrictive than necessary.5'
However, a dissent joined by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that it was reasonable to believe that the speech restrictions
directly advanced the Government's interest in protecting the
health and safety of the American public and that Congress could
not have achieved its safety objectives in significantly less restric-
tive ways. 2 Further, as support for upholding the provision, the
dissent argued that the special risks posed by compound drugs
created a danger and that there "is considerable evidence that
consumer oriented advertising will create strong consumer-driven
demand for a particular drug."53
JJ.) (discussing the holding of Central Hudson and noting that the concurring Justices
"expressed doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price
of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to 'dampen' the demand
for or use of the product"); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) ("I share Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems to
me to have nothing more than policy intuition to support it."); id. at 518 (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that where "the government's assert-
ed interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate
their choices in the marketplace," the test adopted in Central Hudson "should not be ap-
plied").
48. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 366-67.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 353a (1998).
50. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 364-65.
Drug compounding is a process by which a pharmacist or doctor combines, mixes, or
alters ingredients to create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual pa-
tient. Compounding is typically used to prepare medications that are not commer-
cially available, such as medication for a patient who is allergic to an ingredient in a
mass-produced product.
Id. at 360-61.
51. Id. at 371-74.
52. Id. at 379, 387-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens &
Ginsburg, JJ.).
53. Id. at 383 (citing NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., FACTORS AFFECTING THE
GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG EXPENDITURES iii (July 9, 1999) (three antihistamine
manufacturers spent $313 million on advertising in 1998 and accounted for ninety percent
Summer 2012 613
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Despite the fact that the commercial speech doctrine has been
unsettled over the years,54 it appears that commercial speech cur-
rently retains its limited protection under the First Amendment,
and the Central Hudson four-part analysis continues to govern.
of the prescription drug antihistamine market)); Francesca Kritz, Ask Your Doctor About..
. Which of the Many Advertised Allergy Drugs Are Right for You?, WASH. POST, June 6,
2000, at Z9 (noting that the manufacturer of the world's top selling allergy drug, the eighth
best-selling drug in the United States, spent almost $140 million in 1999 on advertising);
1999 PREVENTION MAG. 10 (spending on direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription
medicine increased from $965.2 million in 1997 to $1.33 billion in 1998)).
54. See Charles Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 663, 665 (2008); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Ex-
pression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2589-90 (2008). In fact, it appears that even a working
definition of what constitutes "commercial speech" remains elusive. See RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.26 (4th ed. 2007);
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided
in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 (2004). In Hunt v. City ofL.A, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defines commercial speech as "speech that
does no more than propose a commercial transaction." 638 F.3d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989)). However, the Court continues by noting
that:
Although the Supreme Court has also defined commercial speech as "expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 561, 100 S.Ct. 2343, cases decided after Central Hudson have relied on
the "proposal of a commercial transaction" test. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (recognizing the
definition in Central Hudson, but acknowledging that neither Bolger nor Fox used
this definition); see also Coyote Publ'n, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 298 (9th
Cir.2010); White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2007).
Id. at 715 n.6.
55. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667-68 (2011) (applying the
Central Hudson factors to an inquiry into the constitutionality of a regulation burdening
commercial speech); Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 2011) ("But where
only commercial speech is at issue, the time, place, and manner framework does not apply
and courts apply the framework articulated in [Central Hudson]."); Intl Dairy Food Ass'n v.
Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Prophylactic bans on commercial speech are
evaluated under a four-part analysis first set forth in [Central Hudson]."); Educ. Media Co.
at Va. Tech., Inc. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2010) ("Both parties agree that to
determine whether a regulatory burden on commercial speech violates the First Amend-
ment, we apply the four-part test set forth in [Central Hudson]."); Alexander v. Cahill, 598
F.3d 79, 88 (2nd Cir. 2010) (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has established a four-part
inquiry for determining whether regulations of commercial speech are consistent with the
First Amendment" and discussing the Central Hudson test); Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d
442, 445-46 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Regulations of commercial speech must comply with the Cen-
tral Hudson test."); SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 556 F.3d 1337,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying the "[wiell established Central Hudson test" because the
circumstances of the case were very similar to that of commercial speech); Passions Video,
Inc. v. Nixon, 458 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The Missouri statute regulates outdoor
advertising, therefore we must apply the four-step commercial speech analysis outlined by
the Supreme Court in Central Hudson to determine whether the statute is constitutionally
sound."); Nat'l Coalition of Prayer, Inc. v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[Tlhe
Court issued the seminal Central Hudson decision, which established the current governing
test for First Amendment challenges to commercial speech."); This That and the Other Gift
Neuromarketing
III. NEUROMARKETING
The use of neuroscience in marketing is considered to have be-
gun in 1999, when Gary Zaltman, an emeritus professor of busi-
ness administration at the Harvard Business School, began using
functional magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI") in marketing
studies to examine how the brain processes and reacts to adver-
tisements.56 The term "neuromarketing" was not coined until
2002 by Ale Smidts, director for the Center for Neuroeconomics at
Erasmus University in Rotterdam in the Netherlands.57 While
neuromarketing is in its early stages, researchers have been look-
ing to science for help in improving marketing strategies for cen-
turies.
Several different methods for making advertising more effective
or studying the effectiveness of advertising have evolved over
time. Most commonly heard of, subliminal advertising is a histor-
ical method purportedly used by advertisers to market to the sub-
conscious minds of consumers.5" E.W Scripture published his
study of a technique he coined "subliminal messaging" in 1898,
which involved flashing an image or set of words so quickly that
the conscious mind could not register them, but the subconscious
and Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., 439 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Courts use the four-
prong test in Central Hudson to determine if commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment."); Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 106 (3rd Cir. 2004) (stating that the
regulation at issue "must satisfy the test for restrictions on commercial speech set out in
Central Hudson"); Mainstream Marketing Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th
Cir. 2004) ("In reviewing commercial speech regulations, we apply the Central Hudson
test."); Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "[in
Central Hudson], the Supreme Court summarized the four-part analysis used to determine
the constitutionality of government restrictions on commercial speech" and applying the
test), afd in part, rev'd on other grounds Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525
(2001); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying the Central
Hudson test).
56. ZACK LYNCH & BYRON LAURSEN, THE NEURO REVOLUTION: How BRAIN SCIENCE IS
CHANGING OUR WORLD 50 (1st ed. 2009). Gary Zaltman more recently published a book on
researching the thought processes of consumers. See GARY ZALTMAN, HOw CUSTOMERS
THINK: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE MIND OF THE MARKET (2003); Manda Mahoney, The
Subconcious Mind of the Consumer (and How to Reach It), HARVARD BUS. SCH. (Jan. 13,
2003), http:/hbswk.hbs.edu/item/3246.html. Gary Zaltman is apparently currently work-
ing on a method called "Zmet" which stands for Zaltman Metaphor Elicitation Technology,
which is a patented technology that attempts to detect unconscious thoughts with pictures.
Donna Mitchell-Magaldi, Head Games: Neuromarketing Applies to the Power of MRI to
Study Our Reaction to Ads, NERAC (Mar. 26, 2007),
http'//nerac.com/nerac-insights.php?category=articles&id=200.
57. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 50.
58. Stephen Ornes, Whatever Happened to ... Subliminal Advertising?, DISCOVER MAG.,
Feb. 2008, at 12, 12.
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could.59 In 1957, James Vicary claimed he had tapped into the
power of subliminal messaging with his infamous movie screening
experiment, where he claimed that rapidly flashing "Drink Coca-
Cola" and "Eat Popcorn" during the movie made people buy signif-
icantly more popcorn and other snacks.6' The study caused a pub-
lic controversy for years, leading to the banning of subliminal ad-
vertising in Australia, Britain, and the United States.61 But when
other researchers failed to replicate Vicary's results and he came
under pressure, it was discovered about five years later that
Vicary had falsified his results.
62
In the 1970's, subliminal advertising made a return. In 1973,
Wilson Bryan Key published a book on subliminal sexual imagery,
claiming that occult and erotic images were making imprints on
the subconscious mind, while escaping the radar of our conscious
mind.63 The consensus among the scientific fields is that Key
promoted a myth, and yet, another public outcry resulted in the
Federal Communications Commission releasing a policy statement
against subliminal advertising in 1974.64
Another method of studying marketing effectiveness involved
experiments where researcher Herbert Krugman attached a single
electrode to the back of a person's head in order to observe what
59. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 51.
60. Johan C. Karremans et al., Beyond Vicary's Fantasies: The Impact of Subliminal
Priming and Brand Choice, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 792, 792 (2005). Despite
the fact that Vicary lied about his results, the notion that subliminal advertising can influ-
ence individuals continues to persuade consumers, as Americans apparently spend more
than $50 million annually on self-help audiotapes that involve subliminal messages. Id.
"The industry flourishes, even though scientific testing of such tapes in areas of self esteem,
memory improvement, and weight loss failed to find evidence for the effectiveness of these
subliminal suggestions." Id. (citations omitted).
61. Erin J. Strahan et al., Subliminal Priming and Persuasion: Striking While the Iron
Is Hot, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 556, 556 (2002). Strahan's study, however,
argues for a renewed debate about the potential use and abuse of subliminal procedures in
persuasion by a process called "subliminal priming." Id. at 567. "Subliminal priming"
appears to involve subliminally presenting images to affect the subject's behavior towards a
subsequently presented image. See id. at 556 (describing a study concluding that partici-
pants preferred Chinese ideographs that were preceded by a subliminally presented smil-
ing face better than the same ideographs that were preceded by a subliminally presented
scowling face). These subliminal priming studies remain relatively new and further re-
search is urged. Id. at 567.
62. Id.
63. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 53. See also WILSON BRYAN KEY, SUBLIMINAL
SEDUCTION (1973).
64. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 53. The statement released by the FCC as-




happens in a person's mind when he or she watches television. 5
After conducting several such experiments in late 1969, Krugman
concluded that "TV viewing tended to shift people into a passive
and receptive state, characterized by alpha waves emanating in
the brain."6 He also used pupilometers, which measure the
changes in pupil size, to determine what individuals were inter-
ested by, because an individual's pupils automatically dilate when
something is believed to be worth paying attention to.
67
Similarly, eye tracking has been used to study how consumers
react to advertisements.6 ' The method of "[elye tracking makes a
record of the path of a person's eyes when assimilating a visual
message. ' 9 French scientists began studying eye tracking in the
1890s, discovering that eyes typically bounce from one place to
another, as if the brain is trying to find the quickest way to unlock
the information. ° In the 1960's, a Russian psychologist, Alfred
Yarbus, also studied eye tracking and wrote a book on eye move-
ment which was published in America.71 Although eye tracking
did not have the impact marketing researchers hoped, it is still
used today in advertising design, in order to help researchers de-
termine where individuals focus, what attracts attention first, and
how individuals scan or read an advertisement, newspaper, or
product package.72
A scientific measurement used by advertisers in the 1960's is
the Galvanic skin response (GSR), which "measures changes of
electrical conductivity on skin surfaces, which are caused by emo-
tional reactions."7 ' Researchers used this science to determine




69. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 51-52.
70. Id.
71. Id. See also ALFRED L. YARBUS, EYE MOVEMENTS AND VISION (Lorrin A. Riggs ed.,
Basil Haigh trans., Plenum Press 1967).
72. See Soussan Djamasbi et al., Generation Y, Web Design, and Eye Tracking, 68 INT'L
J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 307, 307 (2010) (discussing eye movement research to improve
the effectiveness of web design in marketing to Generation Y); Rik Pieters & Luk Warlop,
Visual Attention During Brand Choice: The Impact of Time Pressure and Task Motivation,
16 INTL J. RES. MKTG. 1, 1 (1999) (noting that the visual attention of consumers has been
largely disregarded in marketing research, but arguing that studying eye-movement is an
important component of brand preference research).
73. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 53.
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how people responded emotionally to marketing devices, such as
brand names, background music, and advertisements.
While attempts to use science to make advertising more effec-
tive is certainly nothing new, neuromarketing is different. Neu-
romarketing has created a fundamental shift in the scientific
community, as to the ability of researchers to study human emo-
tions and cognitive processes.
75
Neuroscience and the use of brain imaging allow researchers to
actually see the brain in action, and with the current scientific
understanding of how the brain operates, researchers can inter-
pret the images to determine how people process and react to ad-
vertisements. As one Virginia Mobile USA marketing executive
told the New York Times in March of 2008, "[i]nstead of hypothe-
ses about what people think and feel, you actually see what they
think and feel."76 Currently, the brain imaging technique used
most often is the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
77
The fMRI allows a researcher to observe the brain as it functions,
using an MRI scanner to see "changes over time in the ratio of ox-
74. Id. A recent form of marketing that has risen out of studies researching how to
affect consumers on emotional levels with advertisements is known as "sensory marketing."
Aradhna Krishna, An Integrative Review of Sensory Marketing: Engaging the Sense to
Affect Perception, Judgment and Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-aradhna/JCPS 247rev-prf-ak.pdf. "Sensory
marketing" is defined as "marketing that engages the consumer's sense and affects their
perception, judgment and behavior." Id. A more detailed explanation of how sensory mar-
keting is utilized in the United States is that:
In the U.S., many food manufacturers are emphasizing how their product appeals to
the different senses. For instance, Lindt chocolate's recent ad discusses the art of
chocolate tasting and tells the reader exactly how to employ all five senses in tasting
their chocolate. Many upscale hotel chains have adopted signature scents with the
hope that the scents will helps [sic] their customers better remember other features
of their hotel that they loved, and bring them back. For instance, the Westin hotel
chain has the signature scent of white tea with geranium and Freesia. Intel, NBC,
MGM, and many other brands have signature sounds which announce that it is in-
deed their brand that the consumer is listening to. Bottles like those for Orangina
have adopted shapes and textures that resemble the raw material of the product it-
self, in this case the orange, to stand out from other products, and also to appeal to
the consumers' haptic sense.
Id. This attempt to use advertising to reach consumers' senses and make them react on a
subconscious level is a step away from neuromarketing research, which also strives to per-
suade consumers on a subconscious level.
75. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 53.
76. Id. at 48 (citing Stuart Elliott, Is the Ad a Success? The Brain Waves Tell All, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 31, 2008, http'J/www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/business/media/31adcol.html).
77. Peter Kenning, Hilke Plassmann, & Dieter Ahlert, Applications of Functional Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging for Market Research, 10 QUALITATIVE MKT. RES.: INT'L J. 135, 139
(2007).
ygenated to de-oxygenated hemoglobin in the brain."78 The scan-
ner measures this ratio, and under the Blood Oxygen Level De-
pendence ("BOLD") hypothesis, it is believed that "an influx of
fresh, more highly oxygenated blood" is seen in the "areas of the
brain where the neurons have recently 'fired." 9 Using the meas-
urements of the scanner, a researcher is able to determine "what
brain regions are active during various mental activities, by hav-
ing people in a scanner see, hear, do, move, or think about some-
thing and then, a few seconds later, see which [part of the brain]
had an increase in the ratio of oxygenated to de-oxygenated hemo-
globin."" Then, researchers must interpret these images.
The usefulness of the images is based on current scientific un-
derstanding of how the brain functions. Most people are aware of
the distinction between the left brain and the right brain, but
"[t]he brain can also be categorized into three distinct parts that
act as separate organs with different cellular structures and dif-
ferent functions."8' These three different parts have specialized
functions, with the "old brain" in the center, being a primitive or-
gan that is deemed our "survival brain." 82 Although the "old
brain" takes into account input from the other two parts of the
brain, it is the actual trigger of decision.83 The two newer portions
of the human brain, in terms of evolution, are the "middle brain,"
which processes emotion and gut feelings, and the "new brain,"
which processes rational data.84 Researchers, using fMRI images,
can determine which of these portions of the brain is used during
a given study.
Neuromarketing researchers use this understanding of how the
brain functions to observe many different aspects of how consum-
er's brains process advertisements. Gerry Zaltman, the first re-
searcher credited with using neuroscience in marketing research,
believes that ninety-five percent of our thinking occurs subcon-
sciously and that marketing is most successful when it makes a
78. Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the
Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 694 (2009). See also John C. Gore, Principles and Practice of
Functional MRI of the Human Brain, 112 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 4, 4 (2003).
79. Greely, supra note 78, at 694.
80. Id.
81. PATRICK RENVOISE & CHRISTOPHE MORIN, NEUROMARKETING: UNDERSTANDING
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psychological link with our deep brain areas.8 5 He asserts that
"[if our old brain parts decide a product will make us feel connect-
ed to a larger group or help us hook up with a desirable mate,
we're going to want to buy it" and that this psychological link be-
comes more important to marketers' strategies than actually mak-
ing the best product.16 Ale Smidts, who coined the phrase "neu-
romarketing," used fMRI imaging studies to prove the effective-
ness of expert or celebrity product endorsements.8 7 In his 2006
presentation on his work at the University of Michigan, Smidts
showed that even seeing a combination of a product with a celebri-
ty or expert just one time "leads to a long-lasting change in
memory for an attitude towards the product."8 Brian Knutson, a
Stanford researcher, undertook a study of incentive processing,
which looks at what the brain does when it is trying to determine
whether a choice will lead to a good result (i.e., food, sexual pleas-
ure, or money), or something bad. 9 Knutson found in his research
that money really excites the brain, and he has focused his work
on determining how brains react to spending, losing, or earning
money.9 °
An important aspect of neuromarketing research is that the re-
searcher does not have to rely on what the individual test subjects
report, but can instead observe firsthand how their brains react to
advertisements. Neuroscience research has already shown that
consumers' stated advertising preferences often do not always co-
incide with what the brain itself reveals through neuroscience im-
aging.9 For example, one Boston ad agency, Arnold Worldwide,
published a small private study that used fMRI machines at Har-
vard's McLean Hospital to see what occurred in the brains of six
men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four when they
looked at images being proposed for a 2007 campaign for Brown-
Forman (their client, who owns Jack Daniel's).92 Because of the
rich charcoal flavoring of the bourbon, the brand's advertising had
long sought to create a back-woodsy appeal by featuring older, ru-




89. Id. at 54.
90. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 54.
91. Douglas L. Fugate, Marketing Services More Effectively with Neuromarketing Re-
search: A Look into the Future, 22 J. SERVS. MKTG. 170, 171 (2008).
92. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 55.
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ral men.93 However, Jack Daniel's had more recently become a
favorite of many rock bands and young people who began calling it
"Jack."4 The researchers sought to test the older advertisements
with the rugged, outdoor scenes against advertisements featuring
young people having fun on spring break.95 The research subjects,
all whiskey drinkers, stated overwhelmingly that they preferred
the rugged, outdoorsy scene, but the neuroimaging actually
showed that their brain activity was much higher when shown the
pictures of the young people having fun on spring break.96 Thus,
the "fMRI not only showed that there was a gap between what the
consumers thought that they thought and what they really
thought, but also proved what images would fill that gap and score
the best connection to the market."97 Neuromarketing allows
companies to determine individuals' emotional responses to
brands and brand preferences, even when the individual may be
unaware of the brand's effect on his or her subconscious decision
making.
98
Neuromarketing is also being used to gain insight far beyond





97. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 55. This is an important development, be-
cause in some instances, relying on reported opinions can prove problematic. For example,
when Chrysler Corporation surveyed car buyers shortly after World War II and asked po-
tential buyers what they looked for in purchasing new cars, people reported overwhelming-
ly that economy and reliability were of the utmost importance in their purchase decisions.
Id. Relying on the surveys, Chrysler put out Plymouths that were mechanically reliable
but not innovative in design. Id. Yet, Cadillac came out around the same time with a
much more flashy design, and people loved it. Id. at 55-56. Chrysler lost massive market
share. Id. at 56. Apparently, even though living through the war era had made people
appreciate economy and reliability, an underlying hunger for excitement existed, manifest-
ing itself in their desires for the more exciting, flashy automobiles. LYNCH & LAURSEN,
supra note 56, at 56.
98. See Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Cul-
turally Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 379 (2004). Recently, after a proposed new Gap logo
led to online protests, NeuroFocus, a Neuromarketing Company, decided to research how
the human brain responds to bad advertising. Jessica Hamzelou, Can Neuroscience Help
Gap Produce a Better Logo?, NEwSCIENTIST (Oct. 20, 2010),
http'//www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience2010/10/-normal-0-false-false-2.html.
The company used EEC and eye-tracking techniques to investigate the neural responses of
volunteers being shown the old and new Gap logos. Id. NeuroFocus found that the new
logo did not register as novel or stylish in the volunteers' brains. Id. NeuroFocus issued a
press release outlining "neurological best practices" for creating brand images. Id.
99. Fugate, supra note 91. See generally ERIK DU PLESSIS, THE ADVERTISED MIND:
GROUND BREAKING INSIGHTS INTO How OUR BRAINS RESPOND TO ADVERTISING (2005);
Peter Kenning et al., Applications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging for Market
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niques may be able to clarify our understanding of the unique de-
cision making process of consumers when it comes to intangibles,
such as services. 00 Researchers can use fMRI images to deter-
mine which area of the brain processes stimuli, such as those are-
as associated with "trust," "responsiveness," or "empathy."101 Neu-
romarketing can be used to develop pricing strategies that are
more effective. 02 Neuroscience has even been used to predict the
shopping behavior of consumers by observing brain functioning
before an individual makes a decision about purchasing a prod-
Research, 10 QUALITATIVE MKT. RES.: INT'L J. 135 (2007); Nick Lee et al., What is Neuro-
marketing? A Discussion and Agenda for Future Research, 63 INT'L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
199 (2007); Sam M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed
Monetary Rewards, 306 Sci. 503 (2004).
100. Fugate, supra note 91, at 171.
101. Id.
102. Id. According to neuroscience studies, the brain reacts to short-term riches largely
by processing the information in the limbic system, the region that governs emotion. Id.
However, the brain reacts to future rewards by processing the information in the prefrontal
cortex, which is associated with reason and calculation. Id. If in equipoise, "the reward of
immediate economic gratification generated by the limbic region will prevail over the ra-
tionality of deferring rewards generated by the prefrontal cortex." Id. This is helpful for
service products with inherent short term rewards, such as ones associated with food and
entertainment. Fugate, supra note 91, at 171. Yet, service products that provide no imme-
diate rewards (e.g., home protection systems, insurance policies, preventative medicines,
etc.) generate much less emotional involvement and the brain may deem the processing
priority of these products to be much lower. Id. However, if emotional rewards can be
invoked in association with those service providers, it can increase the level of processing
priority for those services. Id. While this may seem intuitive, neuroscience can now be
used to test emotional appeals and determine which emotional appeal generates the ideal
levels of limbic system activity. Id. Subsequently, "once emotional appeals are attained,
rational appeals can then be presented; it is all a matter of sequencing and timing; deci-
sions that can be greatly facilitated by neuromarketing techniques which visually depict
which brain areas are active during presentation of specific marketing stimuli." Id. A clear
example of this strategy at work is the home security commercials that begin with a woman
at home alone, or with her defenseless child, and a burglar attempting to break into the
home, only to be thwarted by the home security system being advertised. Aimee Picchi,
Why Broadview Security Keeps Making Ads that Scare the Hell Out of Us, DAILY FIN. (Feb.
24, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/02/24Iwhy-broadview-security-keeps-making-
ads-that-scare-the-hell-out]. This frightening scene is presented first, before any infor-
mation or pricing of the system is provided. See id. These advertisements are effective,
because they tap into the fear center of our brain and cause an emotional response before
providing the rational information. Id.
Brian Knutson and Antonio Rangel of Cal Tech collaborated on a study and arrived
at similar conclusions about pricing strategies. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 62.
The researchers discovered that people perceive that their enjoyment of a wine will be
greater when it has a higher price. Id. They observed that the higher the price of the wine
was, the more activity occurred in the medial orbitofrontal cortex of the brain. Id. The
researchers asserted that they could affect the amount of activity in the part of the brain
that encodes for subjective pleasantness by changing the price at which subjects thought
the product was sold, without making any changes to the actual product. Id. Ultimately,
the researchers concluded that fMRI-based studies of the brain's reaction to advertisements
and prices will make them more effective. Id.
Neuromarketing
uct. l13 A year-long study was conducted in which fMRI machines
were used to observe individuals' brains while making purchasing
decisions.' °4 During the study, a product would appear on a screen
in front of each individual, followed by a purchase price, and then
the individual was given an option between "yes" (to purchase the
product) and "no" (to decline to purchase the product). 105 In most
of the trials, the buying was imaginary, but in two of the trials,
the individuals were given $20 to make purchases of real prod-
ucts.' 6 The imaging revealed that a certain midbrain area,
thought to be part of our mental reward center, was very active
when the products were first shown and that when the price was
revealed, an area of our newer brain became active (a portion con-
nected with rational thinking and weighing decisions).' 7 The re-
searchers were eventually able to determine from the brain imag-
ing whether an individual would choose to purchase the product
before the individual had indicated his or her choice.' The impli-
cations of this discovery could be wide-ranging, as predicting con-
sumer purchase behavior is the holy grail for advertising and
marketing companies.
Ultimately, the use of neuroscience to make advertising more ef-
fective has vast potential and is already working on some levels.' 9
In a relatively short period of time, much has been discovered in
the realm of neuromarketing." Further, "[e]ach year more pow-
erful advances in brain scanning technology emerge, and those
advances get into the hands of more and more researchers . . .
[meaning that] fundamentally new neurosensing technology will





108. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 61.
109. Even in 2007, researchers were saying that "initial studies show that a reliable and
valid application of functional brain imaging techniques to consumer research questions is
possible. In particular, the initial fMRI studies in the field seem promising." Kenning,
supra note 99, at 148. As early as 2002, Emory University's Neuromarketing Research
Institute claimed that it could "identify patterns of brain activity that reveal how a con-
sumer is actually evaluating a product, object or advertisement ... to help marketers better
create products and services and to design more effective marketing campaigns." Douglas
Rushkoff, Reading the Consumer Mind: The Age of Neuromarketing Has Dawned, CENTER
FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY (Feb. 2004),
httpJ/www.cognitiveliberty.org/neuro/RushkoffNeuromarketing.html.
110. Further, one researcher at Baylor has just put together a five-unit complex of scan-
ners to study how the brain functions in group settings, in an effort to discover the effects of
social pressure on individuals, which is undoubtedly useful information for marketing com-
panies. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 68-69.
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emerge over the next decade driven by the extraordinary economic
value inherent in understanding the human mind.""' Companies
have already been established that specialize in neuromarketing,
and they claim to have big clients demanding their research. 2
There are now books promising that neuromarketing technology
can enable sellers to "dramatically increase" selling effectiveness
and "reach... sustained higher level [s] of success in all... sales,
marketing, and communication efforts." 3 With neuromarketing
companies making these types of claims, it is obvious why more
money is being poured into neuromarketing research each year by.
private companies that are looking to increase the effectiveness of
their marketing. Manufacturers were already spending an esti-
mated $8 billion per year on marketing research, and this number
continues to increase, especially with the new potential of neuro-
marketing.'14
111. Id. at 70.
112. See id. at 49-50. Emerging companies include:
San Francisco's EmSense, which measures brain activity 'for a moment-by-moment
analysis of how audiences respond to advertisements'; London's NeuroCo and Neuro-
Sense; Berkley's NeuroFocus, which is 'applying the latest advances in neuroscience
to the world of advertising and messaging'; Atlanta's BrightHouse; FKF Applied Re-
search of Los Angeles, the self-proclaimed 'Leader in NeuroMarketing'; and Boston-
based Arnold World-wide and Digitas.
Id. See also A.K. PRADEEP, THE BUYING BRAIN: SECRETS FOR SELLING TO THE
SUBCONSCIOUS MIND 7(2010) (discussing advances made by his organization, NeuroFocus).
113. RENVOISE & MORIN, supra note 81, at 4; see also PRADEEP, supra note 112; MARTIN
LINDSTROM, BUYOLOGY: TRUTH AND LIES ABOUT WHY WE BUY (2008).
114. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1429 (1999). This number comes from an
article published in1999. See id. The amount has almost certainly increased in the past
ten plus years.
Further, a more recent study from the American Psychological Association, pub-
lished in 2004, concluded that in the year 2000, advertisers spent $12 billion on advertising
messages aimed at the youth market. Television Advertising Leads to Unhealthy Habits in
Children; Says APA Task Force, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N (Feb. 23, 2004),
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2004/02/children-ads.aspx. The study was conduct-
ed to determine the amount of exposure adolescent children had to advertisements. Id.
Researchers found that the average American adolescents were exposed to approximately
40,000 television commercials per year. Id. However, what is more startling is that the
study did not take into account billboards, newspaper, radio advertising, point-of-sale dis-
plays, direct mail, flyers, and uncountable other types of promotion or advertisement. Id.
Another study that covered expenditures on all traditional advertising forms reported that
national advertisers spent $105 billion on advertising in 2006. Bradley Johnson, Leading
National Advertisers Report: Spending Up 3.1% to $105 Billion, ADVERTISING AGE (June
25, 2007), httpJ/adage.com/print?article-id=118648. And yet another source puts the num-
ber for spending in the United States on all traditional advertising at $152.3 billion. TNS
Media Intelligence Forecasts 1.7 Percent Increase in U.S. Advertising Spending for 2007,
TNS (June 12, 2007), http://www.tnsgloba.com/news/news-
41B1DO8CEF094A98AAD79C2FABF263EB.aspx. While these amounts are staggering,
even these figures do not take into account guerilla advertising campaigns or "stealth mar-
Neuromarketing
A concern that arises with the dramatic increase in neuromar-
keting research is that much of the research is being done in pri-
vate forums and is unregulated. While research conducted in uni-
versities is published and reviewed by academic peers who criti-
cize and test the theories, public funding is limited and govern-
ment agencies, such as the National Institute of Health ("NIH"),
often limit the funding they provide to only fundamental or
groundbreaking studies.'15 The nearly $8 billion spent on market-
ing research by private firms is being used to search for competi-
tive edges that will be kept hidden, preventing the kind of peer
scrutiny and testing that ensure scientific reliability and the con-
sideration of ethical implications.'16 The only reason that public
knowledge exists about some emerging firms that offer neuromar-
keting consultations is that universities lease time in their labora-
tories to these private companies in order to alleviate the costs of
their multi-million dollar neuroscience equipment.1 7 Neuromar-
keting research also remains largely unregulated by any govern-
ment agencies. Traditional methods of marketing research have
not been subject to Institutional Review Board ("IRB") oversight,
because they are not usually viewed as experimentation, and alt-
hough MRI scans are approved by the United States Food and
keting" campaigns that marketers or public relation firms also spend money on. "Stealth
Marketing" is an industry term for word-of-mouth advertising, where advertisers directly
market to consumers in a manner that appears as if it is not marketing, because the person
delivering the message is an actor posing as a friendly stranger or a friend paid to promote
a product. See generally Deborah Branscum, Marketing Under the Radar, CMO MAG., Dec.
22, 2004; Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83
(2006). Another example of similar tactics used in marketing is paying celebrities to make
endorsements over social media without disclosing their paid relationship, which actually
has caused quite an uproar in the United Kingdom and in the United States, prompting
responses from the United Kingdom's Office of Fair Trading and the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission. See Richard Dickinson & Tiana Russell, @AdLawBlog: Undisclosed #Celebri-
ty #Endorsements for Tweets Tick Off UK and US Regulators #gov, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP:
CONSUMER ADVER. L. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2011),
http.//www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/201Vi0l/undisclosed-celebrity-endorsements-
for-tweets-tick-off-uk-and-us-regulators.html; FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing En-
dorsements, Testimonials, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 5, 2009),
http//www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest.shtm. Ultimately, the amount of money poured
into advertising is innumerable. Given this proven willingness to spend, marketers will
most definitely continue to invest massive amounts of funds into making all those advertis-
ing expenditures more effective.
115. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 49, 54.
116. Id. at 48, 54; see also Fugate, supra note 91, at 172 (discussing how 90 neuromar-
keting consultancies have been formed in the United States and in Europe, and that these
agencies boast clients that are Fortune 500 manufacturers and big service firms like
McDonald's, movie studios, large banks, and even a few political campaigns).
117. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 54.
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Drug Administration ("FDA") for clinical use, no diagnosis is being
made in the marketing setting, so companies are able to avoid
both FDA and IRB requirements.1 ' Ultimately, much of the pro-
gress of neuromarketing remains unknown and unchecked, but
what has been published or released shows that neuroscience has
significant potential and is already being used to make marketing
more effective.
The future possibilities for neuromarketing are exciting to re-
searchers and companies that are hoping to profit from the neu-
romarketing research, but some researchers are concerned. One
researcher addressed potential positive and negative uses of neu-
romarketing, stating that "[p]roduct manufacturers could use neu-
ral information to coerce the public into consuming products that
they neither need nor want. However, we hope that future uses of
neuromarketing will help companies to identify new and exciting
products that people want and find useful."'19 Some groups, such
as "Commercial Alert," fear that because marketing is so deeply
implicated in much serious pathology, neuromarketing will only
amplify harmful trends, like childhood obesity or smoking. 2 ' Oth-
er researchers called it a "real possibility" that a "super-heroin of
food products" could be created, where the food product is so "high-
ly tuned to neural responses that individuals may over-eat and
become obese."'21 Another researcher anticipates that "this tech-
nology will further accelerate the mass customization of adver-
118. Dan Ariely & Gregory S. Berns, Neuromarketing: The Hope and Hype of Neuroim-
aging in Business, 11 NATURE REVS. 284, 289 (2010), available at httpJ/www-
psych.stanford.edu/-knutson/bad/arielyl0.pdf.
119. Id. at 291.
120. Douglas L. Fugate, Neuromarketing: A Layman's Look at Neuroscience and Its
Potential Application to Marketing Practice, 24 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 385, 391 (2007); see
also Fugate, supra note 91, at 172. Fugate found that critics such as Consumer Alert fear a
future where:
[Miarketers can induce consumer to make bad purchasing choices by exploiting the
biologically determined structure of the brain. Presumably, visual images (the part
of the brain that deals with sight is more developed than the one that deals with the
more recently acquired language skills) and emotions (which . . . is the basis for all
human behavior) could influence consumers to willingly respond to marketing influ-
ences that they themselves are unaware of and cannot control.
Id.
121. Ariely & Berns, supra note 118, at 289. The authors raise other ethical issues with
neuromarketing, including: neuroimaging being used to gauge a person's preferences out-
side of the specific task being performed; brain responses from a small group of subjects
being used to generalize to a larger population; companies aiming to maximize their short
or long-term profits to the detriment of their customers; and the potential use of neuroim-
aging data to target marketing to specific people or groups who are believed to have a bio-
logical "weakness" that makes them more susceptible. Id.
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tisements, tailored to the emotional state of the viewers" and that
"[t]o counter these more sophisticated techniques, neuromarketing
alert systems will emerge to identify when and where these crafty,
subtle techniques are being employed.1 22 It has even been hy-
pothesized by scientific researchers that "governments may even
go so far as to screen and label [advertisements customized with
neuromarketing research] with specific warnings about its inti-
mately invasive nature, to protect undereducated, unaware com-





Given the potential uses of neuromarketing and the predictions
of some researchers, it is easy to understand why government
regulation of neuromarketing has been surmised. It is important
then to consider how the commercial speech doctrine of the First
Amendment would apply to such a regulation and whether the
government can constitutionally regulate the use of neuromarket-
ing research by advertising companies.
IV. POTENTIAL REGULATION OF NEUROMARKETING UNDER THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Neuromarketing Could Create an Unfair Bargaining Process
Some groups are already urging for a complete ban by the gov-
ernment of neuroscience research in marketing.1 24 A ban of neu-
romarketing (any advertisements or products produced with the
use of neuroscience research) would likely survive constitutional
scrutiny if scientific research is available to support the conclusion
that neuromarketing can manipulate consumers. The use of neu-
roscience to make advertising more effective could create an un-
fair bargaining process, such that neuromarketing falls outside of
the protection of the First Amendment under the commercial
speech doctrine. The same rationale for denying protection to
false or misleading speech in advertising also applies to unfairly
effective neuromarketing, meaning that the government could
constitutionally regulate the use of neuromarketing.
The first prong of the Central Hudson analysis asks whether the
commercial speech "concern[s] lawful activity and [is] not mislead-
ing," in order to determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment at all, as a negative answer to the first
122. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 72.
123. Id.
124. See e.g., Fugate, supra note 120.
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question would end any further inquiry.125 Many cases have held
that commercial speech that is false or misleading is not entitled
to First Amendment protection and may be prohibited entirely. 126
The rationale underlying this prong of the Central Hudson test is
that government regulation of misleading commercial speech is
necessary to preserve a fair bargaining process between the adver-
tiser and the consumer.127 Because commercial speech is generally
defined as "speech which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction,"128 the contractual nature of the speech allows for
governmental regulation in order to prevent undue influence.
129
Under contract law, coercive or misleading speech can invalidate
contracts, and therefore, it makes sense that regulation of coercive
or misleading commercial speech is permissible. 13 0
It is true that advertisements created with the use of neuro-
marketing research may not be presenting factually false infor-
mation and are not misleading in the traditional sense. However,
the argument can be (and has been) made that neuromarketing
could become so effective that it may cause consumers to believe
that they want or need products that they actually might not,
131
and therefore, even while the information provided may not neces-
sarily be factually misleading, it certainly creates an unfair bar-
gaining process. The very same rationale which underlies denying
any First Amendment protection to false or misleading speech ap-
plies to potentially coercive or overly effective neuromarketing,
which can be tailored to appeal to the subconscious decision mak-
ing of consumers. In fact, prohibiting coercive neuromarketing is
essential to preserving a fair bargaining process, and therefore,
125. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
126. Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Testing the Outer Limits of Commercial Speech: Its First
Amendment Implications, 23 REV. LITIG. 607, 610 (2004) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
203 (1982)); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 638
(1985); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383
(1977)).
127. Kuhne, supra note 126, at 612 ("[W]hen the government regulates commercial
messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, it
does so in order to maintain a fair bargaining process.").
128. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976). But see supra note 54 (describing the difficulty of defining commercial speech).
129. See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U.
L. Rev. 372, 390-94 (1979).
130. Id.
131. Ariely and Berns, supra note 118, at 291.
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the government could prohibit neuromarketing entirely and the
Court could uphold it on this basis.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Supreme Court struck
down state limitations on attorney advertising under Central
Hudson,'13 2 but noted that in-person solicitation of clients in situa-
tions that breed "undue influence by attorneys" might well pose
dangers of "overreaching and misrepresentation."'33 Later, in two
companion cases, the Court again discussed the potential for over-
reaching or coercion with in-person solicitation by attorneys.'
The Court recognized that the state had an interest in protecting
the "unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person"3 from
"those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence,
intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious con-
duct."'36 While the Court was careful not to create any broad rules
governing in-person solicitation, the Court was clearly concerned
about the potential for undue influence or coercion in these cas-
es. ' Thus, the Court may be persuaded that the potential for
132. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
133. Bates, 433 U.S. at 366.
134. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978).
135. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 (footnote omitted). The quoted language is actually very
similar to the language used by one scientific researcher in predicting why government
regulation of neuromarketing may occur, stating that "governments may even go so far as
to screen and label [advertisements customized with neuromarketing research] with specif-
ic warnings about its intimately invasive nature, to protect undereducated, unaware com-
munities from the rapid expansion of these technologies." LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note
56, at 72.
136. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462.
137. In Ohralik, the Court upheld the discipline of a lawyer "for soliciting clients in
person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a
right to prevent," in the face of a First Amendment challenge. 426 U.S. at 449. The Court
was very careful to restrict its holding to the facts before the court, providing a detailed
explanation of the appellant's outrageous in-person solicitation as follows:
On the basis of the undisputed facts of record, we conclude that the Disciplinary
Rules constitutionally could be applied to appellant. He approached two young acci-
dent victims at a time when they were especially incapable of making informed
judgments or of assessing and protecting their own interests. He solicited Carol
McClintock in a hospital room where she lay in traction and sought out Wanda Lou
Holbert on the day she came home from the hospital, knowing from his prior inquir-
ies that she had just been released. Appellant urged his services upon the young
women and used the information he had obtained from the McCintocks, and the fact
of his agreement with Carol, to induce Wanda to say "O.K." in response to his solici-
tation. He employed a concealed tape recorder, seemingly to insure that he would
have evidence of Wanda's oral assent to the representation. He emphasized that his
fee would come out of the recovery, thereby tempting the young women with what
sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer. He refused to withdraw when
Mrs. Holbert requested him to do so only a day after the initial meeting between ap-
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neuromarketing to be overly persuasive, to the point of being coer-
cive or misleading, is significant enough to justify a state's interest
in regulating it in order to protect its citizens. 
138
Were it presented with such a regulation today, the Court may
not be inclined to find neuromarketing false or misleading and
exclude it entirely from First Amendment protection under the
first prong of Central Hudson, because the currently published
science and research does not yet support the firm conclusion that
neuromarketing is overly effective, to the point of manipulation or
coercion. '  However, with such rapid advances in the field of neu-
romarketing, were scientific data soon available to support the
notion that neuromarketing is so effective, then the Court may be
persuaded to deny it any First Amendment protection.
Confusingly, there is a complete lack of empirical data about
advertising and its effectiveness in the briefs and arguments that
frame the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases.14 ° In fact, it
pellant and Wanda Lou and continued to represent himself to the insurance company
as Wanda Holbert's lawyer.
Id. at 467. The Court was apparently hesitant to create any broad, per se rule against in-
person solicitation.
The In re Primus companion decision dealt with a lawyer who received a public
reprimand for advising a lay person about her legal rights in person and then disclosing in
a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available. 436 U.S. at 414. In holding the
state's reprimand of the lawyer unconstitutional, the Court distinguished Primus from
Ohralik by concluding that the lawyer's affiliation with the American Civil Liberties Union
and the absence of fraud, overreaching, or other regulable behavior meant that the solicita-
tion fell within the zone of political speech and association protected in NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963). Id. at 435-37. The court also noted the distinction between the letter
and the potential for undue influence with in-person solicitation in circumstances such as
in Ohralik, stating that "[tihe letter was not facially misleading; indeed, it offered 'to ex-
plain what is involved so you can understand what is going on.' The transmittal of this
letter-as contrasted with in-person solicitation-involved no appreciable invasion of priva-
cy; nor did it afford any significant opportunity for overreaching or coercion." Id. at 435
(footnote omitted).
138. Another potentially serious issue is how the Court would handle a government
regulation of advertising for political campaigns that are produced with neuromarketing
strategies. Apparently, political campaigns are already seeking the help of neuromarketing
consultancies in the United States. Fugate, supra note 91, at 172. Political speech is one of
the most protected forms of speech under the First Amendment because it facilitates the
democratic process and our own self-government. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 11.1.2.
On the other hand, the right to vote is a fundamental right under the constitution and is at
the heart of our government system. If political advertisements were created with the use
of neuromarketing strategies and become coercive and manipulative of the decision-making
processes of citizens, this would infringe on the fundamental rights of citizens to vote. How
the Court might handle this conflict of constitutional rights is beyond the scope of this
article, and necessarily left for another day.
139. See Fugate, supra note 120, at 391.
140. Sarah C. Haan, Note, "The Persuasion Route" of the Law: Advertising and Legal
Persuasion, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1311 (2000).
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was not until its decision in 44 Liquormart, decided sixteen years
after Central Hudson, that the Supreme Court made any reference
in a commercial speech case to scientific research on whether ad-
vertising impacts the consumption of products, referring to a sin-
gle study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission on advertis-
ing and liquor consumption.' Still, 44 Liquormart, and a subse-
quent major commercial speech case, Greater New Orleans Broad-
casting Association, Inc. v. United States,"2 both appear to actual-
ly cast doubt on the fairly common notion that advertising affects
consumer behavior and demand for products.143 If courts were
presented today with empirical data that advertising does, in fact,
affect consumer behavior and further research showing the poten-
tial uses of neuromarketing, this first prong of the Central Hudson
analysis may be revised or interpreted differently, in order to al-
low more government regulation of commercial speech.
The Supreme Court may be persuaded to revise the Central
Hudson analysis, because the rationales included in early Su-
preme Court decisions for affording commercial speech First
Amendment protection are completely undermined by the adver-
tisements of today.'44 Advertisements are continuously less in-
formative about products and use visual images and techniques
designed to appeal to consumers on a subconscious level, becoming
increasingly effective with these strategies due to neuromarketing
research. The current lack of information in advertisements cer-
tainly does not contribute to "intelligent and well informed" con-
sumer decisions and to "the free flow of commercial information"
that is "indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to
how [society] ought to be regulated or altered," as the Supreme
Court justified protecting commercial speech in Virginia Board.14
141. Id.
142. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
143. Haan, supra note 140, at 1311.
144. Some commentators have argued that commercial speech should receive little to no
First Amendment protection at all. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Com-
mercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 981 (2009) ("The world would do well not to follow the lead
of the United States in its view that commercial speech is an aspect of free speech."); Fisch-
ette, supra note 54, at 687 ("One might argue that [an analysis of the landmark Supreme
Court commercial speech decisions] has shown that commercial speech has political rele-
vance, but only at the cost of showing that almost everything does. That would make all
speech subject to First Amendment protection, a conclusion few are willing to reach.");
Piety, supra note 54, at 2584 ('There are good reasons to conclude that protection for the
freedom of speech of commercial entities should not excite our tenderest solicitude-at least
not as a matter of First Amendment.").
145. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976). Another author has commented on the dramatic change in advertising since
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Ultimately, if scientific research becomes available to support
the notion that neuromarketing advertisements are so effective
that an unfair bargaining process is created and consumers are
misled, a complete ban of neuromarketing by the government
could pass a constitutional challenge, even under the current Cen-
tral Hudson framework. While advertising created with the use of
neuromarketing techniques may not qualify as factually false or
misleading, the advertisements could certainly become coercive
and create an unfair bargaining process, if what some researchers
are predicting materializes. The same rationales would be appli-
cable to manipulative neuromarketing advertisements that sup-
port denying false or misleading commercial speech any First
Amendment protection under Central Hudson. Neuromarketing
would thus not be granted First Amendment protection under the
commercial speech doctrine, and the government could constitu-
tionally enact a ban prohibiting it entirely. However, given the
Supreme Court's past commercial speech decisions, it may be hesi-
tant to exclude neuromarketing from First Amendment protection
entirely, so the full Central Hudson analysis must be considered.
B. Substantial Government Interests Support Neuromarketing
Regulations Under Central Hudson
Even if the Court was not inclined to conclude that neuromar-
keting falls outside of the protection of the First Amendment, a
complete ban of neuromarketing may still be upheld under the full
Central Hudson four-part analysis, because the government inter-
est in preventing consumer manipulation is so substantial. If the
Court concludes under the first prong of Central Hudson that
commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading,
the commercial speech is afforded some protection under the First
Amendment.146 Then, the Court must consider the rest of the Cen-
tral Hudson four-part analysis in order to determine whether the
the 1970s and the striking decline in the "informativeness" of advertisements. See Haan,
supra note 140, at 1287. One then wonders whether the Supreme Court commercial speech
cases might come out differently if analyzing the advertisements of today and with justices
who had more exposure to current marketing strategies. As Haan noted in her discussion
of persuasion in advertising and in the law, "young judges today represent the first genera-
tion of magistrates to have experienced full-force the revolution in marketing to children-
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, was about fifteen-years old when
the first ad agency targeting children opened for business." Id. at 1322.




government regulation of the commercial speech is constitution-
al.147 Although the four parts of the Central Hudson analysis are
not entirely distinct inquiries and are quite interrelated, each
prong raises a relevant question that, although not dispositive
itself, informs the judgment concerning the other three prongs.14
The second prong of Central Hudson asks "whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial.1 49 I propose two govern-
mental interests that could be asserted to support a complete ban
of neuromarketing and analyze each under the full Central Hud-
son inquiry. If scientific research becomes available to support the
predicted manipulative potential of neuromarketing, the Court
would likely uphold a ban of neuromarketing under either gov-
ernmental interest, but as discussed below, the level of scrutiny
throughout the analysis would be different.
Related to the argument for excluding neuromarketing from
First Amendment protection entirely, one potential governmental
interest for a ban of neuromarketing could be an interest in pre-
serving a fair bargaining process by preventing overly effective
advertising (i.e., preventing consumers from making choices based
on advertising that appeals to their subconscious, bypassing any
rational analysis of actual needs or wants). A second potential
governmental interest could be based on a desire to prevent com-
panies from using neuromarketing to increase the consumption of
harmful products or the overconsumption of benign products. 5 '
The first government interest may receive more deference under
147. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1995) (outlining the Central
Hudson test and noting that because both parties agreed the advertisements only sought to
disclose "truthful, verifiable, and nonmisleading factual information," the analysis for de-
termining constitutionality focused on the remaining factors of the test).
148. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 183-84. "Partly because of these intricacies, peti-
tioners as well as certain judges, scholars, and amici curiae have advocated repudiation of
the Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more straightforward and stringent
test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech" however,
"Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an ade-
quate basis for decision." Id. at 184.
149. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
150. Problems have already arisen with the consumer-driven nature of current society.
See Andrew N. Christopher & Barry R. Schlenker, Materialism and Affect: The Role of
Self-Presentational Concerns, 23 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 260, 260 (2004) ("[Rlesearch
suggests that a materialistic orientation is associated with lower levels of psychological
well-being."). If neuromarketing advertisements become capable of increasing consumption
of even products that are not inherently harmful to society, rampant overconsumption of
these products could still have harmful effects. Overconsumption of any product can not
only have harmful environmental effects, but also can cause feelings of emptiness and
dissatisfaction in individuals. See id. at 261-63. Therefore, a substantial governmental
interest may include consumption of harmful products or overconsumption in general.
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current commercial speech precedents, because the governmental
interest is directly related to the commercial speech itself and its
effect on the bargaining process.15' The second governmental in-
terest focuses more on the end result, in that it looks to regulate
ultimate consumer choices, so a proposed ban of neuromarketing
under this governmental interest may receive a more stringent
review. 1 2 Therefore, although both governmental interests would
be deemed substantial,153 the level of deference throughout the
analysis may be affected because of how the specific governmental
interest is tailored.
The third prong of the Central Hudson analysis necessitates a
review of whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted.'54 The Supreme Court has instructed
that "[tihis burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjec-
ture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a ma-
terial degree." 55  A regulation that provides "only ineffective or
remote support for the government's purpose" will not be sus-
tained.5 6
The availability of scientific research to prove the manipulative
effects of neuromarketing is critical at this step of the analysis for
either governmental interest. If researchers are able to accom-
plish the types of results currently being predicted, a complete ban
on neuromarketing-produced commercial speech would be directly
related to preventing the very real harm that the advertisements
may persuade consumers on a subconscious level to purchase
products that rationally, they may neither need nor want. Under
the first governmental interest then, a complete ban of neuromar-
keting would easily pass this step of the Central Hudson analysis.
Yet, even though this regulation is tied directly to the bargaining
151. See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996). See also Com-
mercial Speech-Advertising, 110 HARV. L. REV. 216, 219-20 (1996).
152. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501. See also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 (stating
that courts should review complete bans on commercial speech that are motivated by poli-
cies unrelated to the speech itself with "special care").
153. In the above discussed commercial speech cases, the Court easily moved through
the second prong, recognizing as substantial any government interest intended to protect
public health, safety, or consumers themselves. See e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad.
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484; Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
154. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
155. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
156. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 188.
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process and the commercial speech itself, evidence is necessary to
support the notion that a complete ban on neuromarketing is
needed. Under the current state of scientific research, the gov-
ernment would have a difficult time proving the harm is real. It
appears that sufficient scientific research does not currently exist
to support the proposition that with neuromarketing, consumers
will lose all ability to make rational decisions in the bargaining
process and can be manipulated. Therefore, scientific research
would be necessary for a complete ban of neuromarketing to satis-
fy this prong of the Central Hudson analysis, based on the gov-
ernmental interest of preserving a fair bargaining process.
The second governmental interest (preventing overconsumption
of harmful products or overconsumption of benign products) is
more problematic under this step of the Central Hudson analysis,
because commercial speech cases have generally held that there is
no direct link between advertising and consumer behavior.157 This
governmental interest seeks to prevent harmful consumer behav-
ior and generate an end result that is not directly related to the
bargaining process itself, which means it will likely be subject to a
more stringent review.15 As previously mentioned, the Supreme
Court has not been presented with strong empirical data as to the
effects of marketing on consumer behavior. If the Court were pre-
sented with such data regarding the effectiveness of advertise-
ments produced with the use of neuromarketing research, it might
find that a ban of such advertisements is directly linked to over-
consumption of harmful products promoted by those advertise-
ments. If the neuromarketing science advances to the levels pre-
dicted and research becomes available (and the court is receptive
to it) to support the predictions that neuromarketing will become
manipulative, a ban of neuroscience-produced advertising could
pass this step of the analysis. It would be very important for the
scientific research to clearly show that neuromarketing manipu-
lates consumers and affects consumer behavior. Only then would
a complete ban of neuromarketing be directly related to this gov-
ernmental interest of preventing consumption of harmful products
or overconsumption of benign products.
157. Haan, supra note 140, at 1310-11.
158. Commercial Speech, supra note 151, at 219-20. See also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
500; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 (stating that courts should review complete bans on




Finally, under Central Hudson, the governmental regulation
must be no more extensive than necessary to serve the govern-
mental interest. 19  This part of the analysis complements the
third inquiry as to the direct advancement of the governmental
interest. The government is not required "to employ the least re-
strictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tai-
loring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest-'a fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable. '""' This "fit" need
not represent the "single best disposition but one whose scope is in
proportion to the interest served.'
61
Under this analysis, it is likely that with scientific support, a
complete ban of neuromarketing-produced commercial speech
could be upheld, under either asserted governmental interest.
First, a complete ban of commercial speech produced with the use
of neuromarketing research would prevent the coercion of, or un-
due influence on, consumers that creates an unfair bargaining
process, but would not prevent the dissemination of useful com-
mercial information. Advertisers would be free to implement any
other means of communication to promulgate the same infor-
mation to the public that would have been contained in the neu-
romarketing advertisements. Further, any proposed, lesser alter-
natives may not be as effective at preventing consumer manipula-
tion. Consumers may not be deterred by warnings about neuro-
marketing, or may not understand them, and enforcement of gov-
ernment-required warnings may be difficult. Government-
sponsored education about the manipulative effects of neuromar-
keting may be similarly ignored by, or confusing to, consumers.
Therefore, under the first proposed governmental interest relating
to a fair bargaining process, a complete ban of neuromarketing
would not be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
A complete ban of neuromarketing based on the second govern-
mental interest will again be considered with heightened scrutiny,
because it relates to the end result of the speech (over-
consumption of products). '62 There may be many alternatives that
are more effective in preventing consumption of harmful products
or over-consumption of benign products. However, a complete ban
159. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
160. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 188 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
161. Id.
162. Commercial Speech, supra note 151, at 219-20. See also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
500; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
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of neuromarketing could still be permissible under this govern-
mental interest, if the scientific research becomes available to
clearly demonstrate the manipulative effect of neuromarketing.
This would provide support to the argument that a government
regulation of the commercial speech regarding products, rather
than a regulation of the actual manufacture or sale of the prod-
ucts, is a narrowly tailored means to achieve this governmental
interest. Then, the Court might find a complete ban of neuromar-
keting constitutional, under this governmental interest, consider-
ing the alternative means of communication available to advertis-
ers and the more restrictive measures that the government could
take.
Therefore, it is likely that if scientific research becomes availa-
ble that supports the claims and predictions of neuromarketing
researchers, a complete ban of neuromarketing by the government
could be upheld under the Central Hudson four-part analysis for
commercial speech to further either proposed governmental inter-
est. However, considering the current state of scientific research,
the government could choose to implement other less restrictive
means of regulating neuromarketing. These less restrictive regu-
lations of neuromarketing-produced commercial speech may be
upheld as constitutional now, as discussed below.
C. Government-Required Warnings on Neuromarketing as Com-
pelled Commercial Speech
The government could attempt to regulate neuromarketing by
requiring companies to include warning labels on any neurosci-
ence-produced advertisements, explaining to consumers that these
advertisements have been created with neuromarketing research.
The government has more freedom to regulate commercial speech
than other forms of protected speech, because commercial speech
is not fully protected under the First Amendment.163 The govern-
ment may require advertisements to "appear in such a form, or
include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as
are necessary to prevent its being deceptive."164 Specifically, in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Supreme Court
held that government regulation may require advertisements to
disclose any additional information that is "reasonably related to
163. Kuhne, supra note 126, at 612.




the [government's] interest in preventing deception."165  The ra-
tionale behind allowing government-required disclosures in adver-
tising is that, rather than preventing information from being dis-
seminated to the public, the government is only requiring some-
what more information than would have been presented.'66 Alt-
hough in some instances "compulsion to speak" has been held to
"be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on
speech," in the commercial speech setting, the interests at stake
are not the same.'67 The government is not attempting to "pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein."
168
Therefore, where advertisements are not necessarily inherently
misleading, but only "potentially misleading," a complete ban may
be inappropriate, but restrictions on those commercial messages
may be imposed through the use of "disclaimers or explanation."
169
The Supreme Court has stated that the government may restrict
commercial speech that exerts an "undue influence" on consum-
ers. 7 ' Under this case law, even with the present scientific
knowledge of only the potential for neuromarketing to be manipu-
lative of consumers, this could still justify the government in re-
quiring additional speech as a preventative measure. Neuromar-
keting researchers have already been able to discern some meth-
ods in which advertisements can work on subconscious levels and
affect individuals in ways they do not even realize. It may be only
a matter time before this research is further implemented in ad-
vertising and used in mass to affect the subconscious decision-
making portions of the brains of consumers on a consistent basis.
A government regulation requiring warning messages has al-
ready been hypothesized by one neuroscience researcher when
discussing the use of neuroscience in marketing.' 7 ' One such
regulation might be that any advertisements produced with the
165. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
166. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-51.
167. Id. at 650 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-14 (1997); Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943)).
168. Id. at 651 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
169. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). See also Erin Bierbauer, Note, Liquid Hon-
esty: The First Amendment Right to Market the Health Benefits of Moderate Alcohol Con-
sumption, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1078-79 (1999).
170. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996) (quoting Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977)).
171. LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 72.
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use of neuroscience research have a clearly displayed warning
(much like the surgeon general's warning placed on tobacco prod-
ucts) 17 2 that informs consumers that neuroscience research was
used to produce the advertisement or product and that it could be
manipulative. For example, the warning could be required to
state, "[t]his advertisement has been produced using neuromar-
keting techniques and may manipulate you subconsciously." The
value in this may be questioned because of enforcement issues
17 3
or because the average consumer has minimal knowledge about
neuromarketing techniques, but it may give some companies
pause about using neuromarketing and may grab the attention of
some consumers.'74 Even if an individual consumer is unaware as
to what neuromarketing techniques entail, including the specific
warning about manipulation may alert him or her to the potential
subconscious persuasive power of the advertisements. The gov-
ernment could also research potential counteractive measures and
educate consumers through separate public service announce-
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 112-89) (deeming it un-
lawful to manufacture, package, or import for sale within the United States, any cigarettes
without one of the following labels on its package: "SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnan-
cy; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious
Risks to Your Health; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight; SURGEON
GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide'). See also Rubin,
514 U.S. at 492, 492 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that in the commercial speech
context, the government "often requires affirmative disclosures that the speaker might not
make voluntarily," and citing the Surgeon General's Warning on tobacco labels as an ex-
ample).
173. As evidenced by the following studies, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has
been unable to effectively police all advertisements, and as a result, many advertisements
make misleading or untruthful claims in violation of the law. One study, conducted in
1993, found that not one of the 157 commercial disclosures they studied met all of the re-
quired FTC standards. See Marie Grubbs Hoy & Michael J. Stankey, Structural Character-
istics of Televised Advertising Disclosures: A Comparison with the FTC Clear and Conspic-
uous Standard, 22 J. ADVERTISING 47, 55 (1993). Another study, focusing on pharmaceuti-
cal advertisements published in professional journals, determined that ninety-two percent
of the advertisements they reviewed were in violation of FDA standards in at least one of
twenty-eight categories. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1458 (1999).
Further, "a 1990 study found that television stations' advertising review and acceptance
process 'varied widely' from station to station, and that twenty-one of 426 surveyed stations
had not requested substantiation for any commercial in the past six months." Haan, supra
note 140, at 1295 n.70 (citing Herbert J. Rotfeld et al., Self-Regulation and Television Ad-
vertising, 19 J. ADVERTISING 18, 21-23 (1990)).
174. The backlash to claims about the effectiveness of subliminal messaging in affecting
consumer decision making may be indicative of how consumers might react upon seeing
warnings about the use of neuroscience to create advertisements that appeal to the subcon-
scious. See LYNCH & LAURSEN, supra note 56, at 51.
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ments about how to prevent the manipulative effects of neuro-
marketing advertisements. This would be a less restrictive and
less paternalistic measure than a complete ban on neuromarket-
ing and would allow consumers to decide whether to subject them-
selves to the potential manipulative effects of the advertisements.
Ultimately, "[blecause the extension of First Amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to
consumers of information such speech provides,"'75 and "disclosure
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's in-
terests than do flat prohibitions on speech, 'warning[s] or dis-
claimer[s] might be appropriately required . . .in order to dissi-
pate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.'"'76 Be-
cause scientific research does not yet show that neuromarketing is
currently being used to manipulate consumers, the Court may be
hesitant to uphold a complete government ban of neuromarketing
in the face of a constitutional challenge. However, even under the
current state of science, the government could prove the potential
for neuromarketing advertisements to be manipulative and that a
required warning is directly related to the governmental interest
of preventing an unfair bargaining process. Further, the regula-
tion would not be overly excessive, because requiring the commer-
cial speech to include more information is less extensive than
banning the speech completely; especially taking into account that
the rationale for granting First Amendment protection to commer-
cial speech includes providing consumers with truthful infor-
mation to help them make informed purchasing decisions.177 The
government could then regulate neuromarketing by requiring ad-
vertisements produced with neuromarketing strategies to include
a warning, and given the current commercial speech doctrine and
precedents, it is likely that it would be upheld by the Court.
D. Revival of the Greater/Lesser Principle in the Neuromarketing
Context
Last, another possible approach the government could take in
regulating neuromarketing may be to regulate only the use of
neuromarketing in advertisements for harmful products, or those
products in opposition to public health and safety. For such a reg-
175. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (citing Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976)).
176. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
177. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 325 U.S. at 763-64.
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ulation to be sustained, this would require the courts to revive the
"greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power" rationale originally put
forth in Posadas,1"8 but later overturned in 44 Liquormart.179 The
Supreme Court explained the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-
power rationale in Posadas by asserting that "because the gov-
ernment could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the under-
lying conduct," it is then permissible for the government to take
the lesser step of reducing demand by restricting advertising.18 ° It
appears that the original underlying assumption of the greater-
power-includes-the-lesser-power principle is that commercial
speech does, in fact, directly relate to consumer behavior. This is
evidenced by the Court's decision in Posadas that the regulation
restricting casino gambling passed the third and fourth prongs of
the Central Hudson analysis.18 However, in 44 Liquormart, when
the Court overturned the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power
principle, it rejected the notion that advertising affects consumer
behavior. 82 Admittedly, it would be challenging to convince the
Court to revive the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power prin-
ciple, but the Court might be persuaded if scientific research about
the effectiveness of neuromarketing-produced advertising were
presented to it.183
178. 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986).
179. 517 U.S. 498, 511-12 (1996). Some examples of harmful products or harmful activi-
ty include tobacco, alcohol, and gambling. See David C. Wladeck & John Cary Sims, Why
the Supreme Court Will Uphold Strict Controls on Tobacco Advertising, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J.
651, 656-57, 660 (1998).
180. Posados, 478 U.S. at 346.
181. Id. at 341-42.
182. See Haan, supra note 140, at 1311.
183. Further, circuit court interpretations have continued to vary over when a paternal-
istic approach by states should be upheld to allow regulation of harmful products under the
commercial speech doctrine. See Shannon M. Hinegardner, Note, Abrogating the Supreme
Court's De Facto Rational Basis Standard for Commercial Speech: A Survey and Proposed
Revision of the Third Central Hudson Prong, 43 NEw ENG. L. REV. 523, 553 (2009). In
recent decisions, the Fourth Circuit and Third Circuit have split on the proper application
of Central Hudson when reviewing the constitutionality of government regulations of alco-
hol advertisements in college student publications. Michelle Silva Fernandes, Note, Party
Foul: The Fourth Circuit's Improper Application of the Commercial Speech Test in Educa-
tional Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325, 1349 (2011).
In Educational Media Company at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a ban on alcoholic advertisements in college stu-
dent publications under Central Hudson, finding that the "link between [the regulation]
and decreasing demand for alcohol by college students to be amply supported by the rec-
ord." 602 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2010). As the court of appeals explained, "college student
publications primarily target college students and play an inimitable role on campus."
Educational Media Co., 602 F.3d at 590. Yet, in Pitt News v. Pappert, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying Central Hudson, struck down a regulation
on advertisements of alcoholic beverages in publications of educational institutions. 379
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Some commentators argue that the Court was correct in over-
turning the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power rationale of
Posadas, because the Constitution affords greater protection to
speech under the First Amendment than the Due Process clause
provides to the sale of products.1 4 It is argued that this choice
reflects "the special value placed on the human capacities for
thought and verbal communication" and that "[blecause thought is
so highly valued as a uniquely human activity, interferences with
the operations of the mind are deemed to constitute greater im-
pairments of human dignity than are restrictions on most forms of
conduct."1"5 First, this rationale actually supports the argument
that the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power should apply to
governmental regulation of neuromarketing advertisements for
harmful products, because neuromarketing seeks to manipulate
the subconscious decisions of consumers. This manipulation of
consumers' subconscious is exactly the "interferences with the op-
erations of the mind" that are "deemed to constitute greater im-
pairments of human dignity than ... restrictions on most forms of
conduct."
1 86
Second, in comparing the First Amendment and the Due Pro-
cess clause, this argument does not take into account the distinc-
tion between First Amendment protection in general and the lim-
ited protection granted to commercial speech under the First
Amendment. A complete ban on the sale of products should not be
considered less extensive than government regulation of the com-
mercial speech advertising those products. While commercial
speech has been granted limited protection under the First
Amendment, the rationales for that protection are weak, and
commercial speech has never been placed on the same level with
F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2004). The court conceded there was no dispute that "alcoholic bever-
age advertising in general tends to encourage consumption," Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 107,
however, it found no evidence in the record that targeting advertisements in the narrower
sector of educational publications would decrease demand for alcohol among underage
consumers, given that they would still be bombarded with television and print advertise-
ments for alcohol elsewhere. Id. Although these decisions differ in their end result, they
appear to show that were courts presented with convincing evidence that advertisements
indeed affect consumer behavior, commercial speech regulations of advertisements that
would increase harmful conduct would likely be upheld.
184. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 589, 599 (1996). Justice Stevens drew this same conclusion in his opinion in 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, stating that "it [is] quite clear that banning speech may some-
times prove far more intrusive than banning conduct." 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996).




speech fully protected under the First Amendment.' s ' Therefore,
this argument falters, in that while fully protected speech under
the First Amendment may be elevated to a higher degree than
Due Process protection for the sale of products, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the level of protection for commercial speech is
higher than Due Process protections for the sale of products.
In the realm of neuromarketing-produced commercial speech,
the rationales for abandoning the greater-power-includes-the-
lesser-power principle do not hold up. Under this rationale, the
government could constitutionally implement some form of regula-
tion of the use of neuromarketing for harmful products or those
which the government could ban the sale of completely for public
health or safety concerns. Although such a regulation would be
supported by the underlying principles of the commercial speech
doctrine and the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power ra-
tionale, under the current case law of the commercial speech doc-
trine, it appears well settled that the government cannot regulate
commercial speech merely because it could ban the sale of the
harmful products being advertised.' Therefore, such a regulation
should be upheld in theory, but stands on shaky grounds with the
current commercial speech case law.
V. CONCLUSION
If the predictions of neuromarketing researchers in fact occur,
and the public becomes aware, there will likely be a demand for
the government to regulate neuromarketing, much like there was
with subliminal messaging. If scientific research becomes availa-
ble to the public showing that neuromarketing could potentially
manipulate consumer behavior, it will raise the public's already
heightened suspicion of advertisers. The notion that companies
187. Even some of the strongest advocates for absolute freedom of speech, such as Jus-
tice Hugo Black, the scholar Thomas Emerson, or the political theorist John Stuart Mill,
have each consistently rejected the notion that commercial speech should have any First
Amendment Protection. C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: the
Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2004) ("Nei-
ther Mill nor Black nor Emerson saw freedom of speech as about, or as including, a busi-
ness's speech promoting its sales and profits.").
188. Further, determining what products rise to the level of "harmful," such that the
government can regulate commercial speech dealing with those products could become an
arbitrary process, if one tries to keep the class of products narrow, or could threaten to
engulf the entire commercial speech doctrine, if too many products were included. There-
fore, it might be more difficult now to persuade the Court to revive the greater-power-
includes-the-lesser-power-principle because of the difficult task of determining where to
draw the line for "harmful" products.
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could use brain imaging to make their marketing strategies so
effective that they bypass all individual rational thought and only
appeal to the subconscious, decision-making older brain, is likely
unacceptable to most people. It is probable then that the govern-
ment will seek to regulate neuromarketing in some form, and the
government may be able to do so constitutionally.
Under the current state of available scientific knowledge as to
the capability and use of neuroscience in advertising, the Supreme
Court may not be inclined to uphold a complete ban of neuromar-
keting as constitutional under the present commercial speech doc-
trine. However, the government may already be able to constitu-
tionally require disclaimers in advertisements that alert consum-
ers when advertisements are created with neuromarketing. The
government could also attempt to persuade the Court to revive the
greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power rationale in this context,
in order to allow the government to regulate the use of neuromar-
keting with advertisements of harmful products.
If neuromarketing research establishes in the future that neu-
romarketing is manipulative and can exert an undue influence on
consumers, this would create an unfair bargaining process. Then,
the Court would likely be persuaded to conclude that neuromar-
keting would fall outside the realm of protected commercial
speech, and therefore, be subject to any government regulation,
including a complete prohibition. Ultimately, the government
could constitutionally adopt some form of regulation of neuromar-
keting now, and the government may attempt to regulate it in the
near future, given the accelerated rate of discovery in the neuro-
marketing field.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of qualified immunity exists to shield government
officials and employees from civil liability.1 However, this protec-
tion is conditioned upon two factors: (1) that the conduct of the
government official or employee in question does not violate a
clearly established constitutional or statutory right and (2) that
the right was clearly established so that a reasonable person in
the position of the government official or employee would have
been aware of the existence of the right.2 In 1997, the Sixth Cir-
cuit ruled in Cullinan v. Abramson that both city officials and out-
side counsel were entitled to qualified immunity against federal
1. Qualified immunity is distinguishable from absolute immunity, which is typically
reserved to unequivocally protect judges and prosecutors from being sued on account of
their official acts. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991); Delia v. City of Rialto,
621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657
(2012). Qualified immunity serves the important end of protecting government officials
from litigation arising out of their actions, as long as the violations are not so objectively
clear that any individual in the defendant's position would understand that such conduct is
not protected. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
2. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1074. The Court derived this updated version of the qualified




and constitutional claims.3 More recently, and in stark contrast to
that decision, the Ninth Circuit denied outside counsel the protec-
tion of qualified immunity in Delia v. City of Rialto.4
Surprisingly, this specific issue has not been widely litigated.
That said, the issue of whether outside counsel is entitled to quali-
fied immunity from federal and constitutional civil claims is an
important one for lawyers who practice public sector law. Fortu-
nately, the United States Supreme Court decided to take on this
question in Filarsky v. Delia,5 and the outcome could have a far-
reaching, positive effect on the ability of private attorneys to serve
their public sector clients. On the contrary, had the Court held
that outside counsel is not entitled to qualified immunity protec-
tion, public sector clients would have borne the brunt of the harm.
This is because an outside lawyer would be less likely to employ
aggressive tactics if she knows that she will not have the benefit of
qualified immunity protection. Furthermore, a paradox is created
if in-house counsel is afforded the protection of qualified immunity
while providing the same advice.
This article will attempt to set forth the specific details of the
split between the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and will analyze the merits
of each position before reaching a final determination as to which
approach is preferred. Specifically, Section II will provide a back-
ground of the doctrine of qualified immunity and an examination
of the major decisions addressing the issue. Section III will then
analyze each position and argue that the Supreme Court was cor-
rect when it overruled the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Delia and adopted the position of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Cullinan, granting outside counsel quali-
fied immunity protection when acting in an advisory role to and at
the behest of a government employer.
II. BACKGROUND
Before examining the circuit courts' decisions, a succinct exami-
nation of the history and purpose of qualified immunity is neces-
sary. A detailed discussion of Cullinan v. Abramson and Delia v.
City of Rialto will follow.
3. 128 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 1997).
4. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1081.
5. 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012).
646 Vol. 50
Qualified Immunity
A. Brief Summary of Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity derives its origins from the
common law theory that although government officials should be
held responsible for reckless actions, they should not be subjected
to harassment or liability when they perform their duties reason-
ably and in good faith.6 Although certain aspects of the Court's
qualified immunity analysis have changed over the years,7 the
importance of the doctrine has been consistently recognized due to
the crucial interests that it protects.8 Simply stated, qualified
immunity exists in order to prevent government activity from be-
ing disrupted by litigation aimed at government officials and their
official acts.9
Two cases in particular are at the center of the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity jurisprudence: Saucier v. Katz" and Pearson
v. Callahan." The framework of the analysis currently used by
the Court to resolve assertions of qualified immunity was devel-
oped in Saucier, but it was revised and modified by the Court in
Pearson.2 Specifically, in Pearson, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that its prior holding in Saucier was incorrect, because it
required the Court to go through a two-step analysis, discussed
supra, sequentially. 1 The Pearson Court ruled that a sequential,
two-step analysis was unnecessary, and accordingly, did away
with that requirement. 4 By holding that the sequence was not
mandatory, the Court granted the district and circuit courts lati-
tude to determine, on a case by case basis, which of the two prongs
of qualified immunity analysis should be discussed first.1"
Therefore, when deciding whether a public official is entitled to
qualified immunity, a court will look toward two objective factors,
in any order. 6 One prong of the test is an inquiry into whether
6. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244.
7. Id. at 236-37.
8. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
9. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
10. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
11. 555 U.S. 223. It should be noted that although the Court has made a number of
additional rulings on the issue of qualified immunity, they are outside the scope of this
article.
12. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227.
13. Id. at 234.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 234-35.
16. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Harlow Court discussed the
perils of examining the subjective factors that may or may not have influenced a public
official during the process of discretionary decision-making. Id.
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the facts alleged by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitu-
tional or statutory right. 7 The other prong requires the court to
determine whether that right, if it exists, is so well established
that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
understood it to be clear.'" If there is no violation of a constitu-
tional right or if that right was not clearly established at the time
of the violation, then the defendant is entitled to qualified immun-
ity, and the alleged charges must be dismissed.'9 On the other
hand, if a constitutionally protected right is violated by the de-
fendant's conduct and a reasonable person in the defendant's posi-
tion should have known of the existence of the right at the time,
then the official will not receive qualified immunity protection.2 °
Additionally, the Supreme Court has touched upon whether to
grant qualified immunity to private parties who are working close-
ly with government officials.21 In Tower v. Glover, the Court de-
termined that public defenders are not entitled to qualified im-
munity for intentional misconduct.22 The significance of this case,
however, lies in the Court's suggested analysis that should be
used when determining whether qualified immunity should ap-
ply.23 Specifically, the Court stated that "[s]ection 1983 immuni-
ties are 'predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity
historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the
interests behind it."'24 Accordingly, the Court then examined the
history of immunities of certain public and private officials dating
back to English common law.25
Subsequently, the Court in Richardson v. McKnight referenced
this discussion in finding that qualified immunity should not be
extended to prison guards who are employees of a private prison
management firm, because there is no basis, historical or other-
17. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-33.
18. Id. at 232-33.
19. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
20. Id.
21. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407 (1997); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S.
914, 921-22 (1984).
22. Tower, 467 U.S. at 921. It should be noted that under the Supreme Court's current
framework, an official is not entitled to qualified immunity when the official commits inten-
tional misconduct. Id.
23. Id. at 920-21.
24. Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1946)).
25. Id. State courts have historically granted immunity to private individuals serving
in public capacities, so long as there can be a showing of good faith on the part of the actor.
See Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94, 94-95 (Cal.1856); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263, 265 (Ill.
1880); Henderson v. Smith, 26 W.Va. 829, 836 (W. Va. 1885).
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wise, to suggest that such individuals should receive that protec-
tion.26 However, the Court noted that some private actors, such as
doctors and lawyers, traditionally received qualified immunity
protection at common law.2 ' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's
general rule is that private parties are not entitled to qualified
immunity.
28
B. The Split Between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
In 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in Cul-
linan v. Abramson that outside counsel should be afforded the
same qualified immunity protection as government employees.
29
The Court premised this determination on the theory that outside
counsel, when acting at the behest of government officials, had
entered into an agency relationship that entitled counsel to the
protection.3" However, in 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit rejected this rationale in Delia v. City of Rialto and refused
to extend qualified immunity protection to outside counsel."
In Cullinan, the investment managers for a police pension fund
brought civil actions against the city, its mayor, several of its offi-
cials, and its outside counsel for alleged misconduct surrounding
the dismissal of certain city managers.3 2 Specifically, the plaintiffs
brought civil rights claims under the Klu Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and claims for relief under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961.33 The de-
fendants, including the city's outside counsel, invoked the protec-
tions of qualified immunity.3 4 The district court denied the de-
fendants' motions to dismiss based on immunity claims, stating
that the issue should be decided at the summary judgment
phase.35 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.36
26. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407.
27. Id.
28. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992).
29. 128 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 1997). Courts do not dispute that lawyers who are pub-
lic employees ("in-house counsel") are entitled to the same qualified immunity protection as
any other government employee, assuming that the two-part test is resolved in their favor.
Id.
30. Cullinan, 128 F.3d at 310.
31. Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Filarsky
v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012).
32. Cullinan, 128 F.3d at 303.
33. Id. at 306.
34. Id. at 307.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 312-13.
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With respect to outside counsel's qualified immunity claims, the
court opined that although qualified immunity is usually inappli-
cable to private parties, some factual circumstances would give
rise to an extension of the right.37 One such circumstance, accord-
ing to the court, is when attorneys are acting as agents of govern-
ment.3 8 The court's analysis was prefaced on the common law the-
ory that under certain circumstances, private defendants, such as
doctors and lawyers, should be entitled to immunity when these
individuals perform services "at the behest of the sovereign."39
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals derived this rationale from the
dictum of the Supreme Court decision in Richardson v.
McKnight." Accordingly, the court reasoned that because the
city's in-house counsel was involved in the same controversy, per-
forming the same acts, and entitled to qualified immunity, the
city's outside counsel should also be shielded from liability.4" The
court predicated its holding on the important interest behind the
existence of qualified immunity, which is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's background discussion of qualified immunity in
Richardson." Cullinan has remained good law within the Sixth
Circuit.43
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a com-
pletely different standard when confronted with the same issue in
Delia v. Rialto.44 The dispute in that case arose out of an internal
affairs investigation conducted by the city that allegedly violated a
firefighter's Constitutional rights pursuant to § 1983. Specifical-
37. Cullinan, 128 F.3d at 310. The court points out that doctors and lawyers have been
afforded similar protection in the past when performing acts at the direction of a sovereign.
Id. (citing Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407 (1997)).
38. Id. at 310-11.
39. Id. at 310 (citing Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407).
40. Id. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. Cullinan, 128 F.3d at 310 (citing Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407).
43. In a later case, Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 952 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals acknowledged its prior holding in Cullinan; however, it distinguished
the facts of the two cases and declined to grant qualified immunity to a private lawyer.
Cooper, 203 F.3d at 952-53. In Cooper, a non-government attorney sought qualified im-
munity protection after working alongside city prosecutors during an investigation of sev-
eral nightclubs. Id. at 952. However, the court noted that the attorney in Cooper, unlike
the attorney in Cullinan, was neither paid by the city nor retained in any capacity. Id.
Therefore, the Cooper Court held that the attorney in question was not entitled to qualified
immunity, because he was not "acting at the behest" of the government when he committed
the alleged misconduct. Id. at 952-53.
44. 621 F.3d 1069, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct.
1657 (2012).
45. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1070; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
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ly, the plaintiff firefighter alleged that fire department officials, in
conjunction with a private attorney retained by the City, conduct-
ed an unreasonable search of his property when they threatened
him with disciplinary action if he did not enter his home, retrieve
certain items for inspection, and bring these items outside.46 The
facts showed that the outside counsel, Filarsky, initiated the al-
leged misconduct at the behest of his city employers.47
All of the defendants, including Filarsky, filed for summary
judgment, asserting that their conduct had not violated Delia's
constitutionally protected rights and that, regardless of the al-
leged violations, they were entitled to qualified immunity protec-
tion.4" The district court concluded that all of the defendants were
shielded from liability based on qualified immunity and granted
summary judgment in their favor.49 As a result, Delia appealed
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, insofar as the
city officials were concerned, but reversed as to Filarsky, ruling
that he was not entitled to qualified immunity.5 °
By finding that outside counsel was not protected by qualified
immunity, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly declined
to follow the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Cullinan.1 However, the court did not state that it disagreed with
the Sixth Circuit Court's rationale, but rather that it was bound
by a prior Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, because no in-
tervening legislation, en banc circuit ruling, or Supreme Court
case had disrupted this precedent. 2
The prior case, Gonzalez v. Spencer, involved a private attorney
who had asserted qualified immunity following unlawful conduct
performed during her defense of Los Angeles County in a law-
suit.53 In deciding not to extend qualified immunity to Spencer,
the court found that she was a private, non-governmental employ-
ee, who had failed to show any "special reasons" why she was enti-
tled to governmental immunity protection.54 In Delia, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed this prior holding that outside
46. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1072-73.
47. Id. at 1072.
48. Id. at 1073.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1085.
51. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1080-81.
52. Id. (citing In re Findley, 593 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010)).
53. 336 F.3d 832, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2003).




counsel is not entitled to qualified immunity protections when a
plaintiff alleges a violation of statutory or constitutional rights in
the context of a civil suit.5 5 As a result of this decision, competing
standards were in place in the Sixth and Ninth circuits, giving
rise to substantial uncertainty in the spectrum of qualified im-
munity as it pertains to a private lawyer advising a public-sector
client.
The Supreme Court addressed this uncertainty when it granted
certiorari in Filarsky v. Delia.5" In its opinion, the Court unani-
mously ruled that Filarsky, as a private attorney working in a
government capacity, was entitled to qualified immunity protec-
tion.57 The Court expressed particular concern that to hold other-
wise would jeopardize the ability of local governments, which lack
the resources to employ full-time lawyers, to obtain effective legal
assistance." As the Court noted, the facts of Filarksy support the
application of qualified immunity, which exists to ensure "that
talented candidates are not deterred from public service" and to
prevent "harmful distractions from carrying out the work of gov-
ernment that can often accompany damages suits." 9 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court cleared up the ambiguity created by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Delia.
III. ANALYSIS
In Cullinan v. Abramson, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
tended the doctrine of qualified immunity to outside counsel based
upon common law principles that have been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. ° Moreover, while the Sixth Circuit
remained the only federal circuit to explicitly grant qualified im-
55. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1080-81. Additionally, a United States District Court in Texas
also declined to follow Cullinan and ruled that outside counsel should not be entitled to
qualified immunity protection. See Venable v. Keever, 61 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562 (N.D. Tex.
1999). Specifically, the court opined:
The attorney defendants are not public officials whose job involves the exercise of a
discretionary function. Moreover, no public interest is unduly impaired if the attor-
ney defendants are required to proceed to trial or further litigate to resolve their legal
dispute with Plaintiffs. If the attorney defendants are granted qualified immunity, it
would apply and be available to virtually every independent contractor or agent who
works on behalf of the government and that is not the purpose of qualified immunity.
Venable, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
56. 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012).
57. Id. at 1667.
58. Id. at 1665-66.
59. Id. at 1665.
60. 128 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407).
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munity to outside counsel up until the Supreme Court addressed
the issue, other circuit courts had applied the doctrine to non-
lawyer private actors in certain situations before the Supreme
Court did away with this practice in Richardson.61 Further, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not reject the holding in
Cullinan v. Abramson because it disagreed with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's rationale, but rather because it was compelled by stare deci-
sis to follow its own precedent.62 For these reasons, the Supreme
Court reached the proper decision when it recently overturned the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and adopted the Sixth Circuit's
standard, allowing outside counsel qualified immunity protection
under limited circumstances.63
A. The Spirit of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine
The general rule that public officials are eligible for qualified
immunity is prefaced on the notion that only government officials
should be shielded from liability in such a broad sense, because
their ability to act with impunity should not be compromised.64 As
a result, there are few exceptions to this general rule. According-
ly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, prior to its holding in Culli-
nan, refused to apply qualified immunity to non-lawyer private
litigants in Duncan v. Peck.65 In that case, much like in Cullinan
v. Abramson, the court looked to the common law for guidance.66
Specifically, the court recognized that the common law traditional-
ly did not grant qualified immunity to private parties, because the
rationale behind the doctrine was generally inapplicable when
private actors were simply pursuing profit, as opposed to carrying
out a civic duty.67 However, as the same court later pointed out in
Cullinan, the common law does support the notion that certain
private actors, when discharging duties assigned by the govern-
61. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1661; Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412. Some of the cases abro-
gated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Richardson include: Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d
1225, 1234 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Richardson, 521 U.S. 399; Frazier v. Bailey, 957
F.2d 920, 928-29 (1st Cir. 1992), abrogated by Richardson, 521 U.S. 399; and Auster Oil &
Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Richardson, 521 U.S.
399. The specific issue of whether outside counsel should be afforded qualified immunity
protection has not been addressed by courts in other federal circuits.
62. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1080 (citing In re Findley, 593 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010)).
63. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667.
64. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
65. 844 F.2d 1261, 1263-64, 1267 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that private litigants were
not immune from a shareholder's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010)).




ment, should be entitled to qualified immunity protection.6' At
common law, it is not surprising that doctors and lawyers, two
traditional professions, received added protection.69 Moreover,
Supreme Court jurisprudence evidences that this principle has
been given recognition in the past.7 °
The important distinction to be drawn from all of this is that ac-
tions taken by private individuals in the name of government
must be distinguished from those taken merely in the pursuit of
profit. It is the motive, not the actor, which the common law is
concerned with.71 For example, in order to justify the application
of qualified immunity, the law must assume that when a govern-
ment official acts, he has the public's best interest at heart.
Therefore, it follows that the government official's motive must be
to achieve some civic good. In contrast, when a private individual
acts, the law assumes that he has his own interests-monetary,
self-preservation, etc.-at heart. In other words, the private ac-
tor's motive is to achieve a personal end. As a result, the law does
not offer immunity to private individuals. However, when a pri-
vate individual acts as an agent of government, the foregoing dis-
tinction becomes less clear. In that situation, a court should be
willing to make an exception to the general rule, because the pri-
vate individual's motive has shifted. When acting as an agent of
government, the private individual takes on the government's mo-
tivation, which is assumed to be the performance of a civic good.
Although only the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has specifical-
ly granted qualified immunity to outside counsel, other circuits
had previously extended the doctrine to private citizens until the
Supreme Court in Richardson disallowed that approach.72 How-
ever, the Supreme Court, by generally eliminating the extension of
qualified immunity to private parties, left the door cracked open
for future litigation by recognizing that under the common law,
qualified immunity was sometimes extended to certain private
68. Cullinan v. Abramson, 128 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omit-
ted).
69. Cf Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-21 (1984). This case notes that in England,
barristers were immune from liability for the commission of all but intentional torts when
representing their clients. Tower, 467 U.S. at 921. The Court traced the history of quali-
fied immunity for lawyers, when performing their professional duties, to this practice. Id.
70. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407 (1997). Cf. Tower, 467 U.S. at 921.
71. See generally Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1264; Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94, 94-95
(Cal.1856); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263, 265 (Ill. 1880); Henderson v. Smith, 26 W.Va.
829, 836 (W. Va. 1885).
72. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412.
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parties, such as doctors and lawyers.73 While the Supreme Court
in Richardson mentioned this possibility only in passing, the
Court did nonetheless recognize the existence of a distinction be-
tween private individuals acting alone and certain classes of pri-
vate individuals acting on behalf of the government. 4
In more practical terms, holding outside counsel to one standard
and in-house counsel to another when both have performed the
same acts based on the same governmental direction produces an
unconscionable result. This is particularly true because the same
employer compensates both types of lawyers for their services.
While the distinction between inside and outside lawyers may be
significant for some reasons, it should not operate to deny protec-
tion to one while granting it to the other, when all other things are
equal.
It must also be noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
did not reject the Sixth Circuit's holding in Cullinan v. Abramson
outright." While the court did expressly decline to follow the por-
tion of Richardson cited by the Cullinan Court because it was dic-
ta, it also stated that it was bound by its own precedent to deny
qualified immunity protection to outside counsel.76 As a result,
while the Ninth Circuit Court was correct to exercise judicial re-
straint, it failed to reach the proper decision. Based on the lan-
guage of that case, perhaps the court was aware of this, because it
offered no opinion on the wisdom of the Sixth Circuit's rule, but
rather simply stated that it was bound to follow its own precedent
and was "not free to follow the Cullinan decision."
v7
In the end, the Ninth Circuit's decision chose to ignore the plain
language of the Supreme Court in Richardson, which suggested
that doctors and lawyers may be entitled to qualified immunity
when acting at the behest of government. The result of this deci-
sion was that outside counsel had to be cautious when advising
and acting on behalf of public sector clients. This added layer of
concern prevented a law firm that provides outside counsel from
serving its clients to the highest degree possible due to the concern
that it would be subject to liability for performing what would oth-
73. Id. at 407.
74. Id.
75. Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Findley,
593 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010)), rev'd sub nor. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657
(2012).
76. Delia, 621 F.3d at 1080-81 (citing Findley, 593 F.3d at 1050).
77. Id. at 1080 (citing Findley, 593 F.3d at 1050).
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erwise be considered an official act. Moreover, this issue had been
well settled in the Sixth Circuit, providing public law practitioners
with a degree of assurance and had not arisen elsewhere until the
Delia v. Rialto decision. However, in the wake of Delia, and prior
to the Supreme Court's decision, this protection explicitly existed
only in the Sixth Circuit.
B. The Supreme Court's Reversal of Delia
In reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Delia, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the state of the
common law as it existed when § 1983 was enacted.78 This is not
surprising, given the Court's past remarks in Richardson regard-
ing a possible distinction in the common law between private law-
yers acting on their own and those acting on behalf of a govern-
ment entity. 9 However, in Filarsky, the Court was even more ex-
plicit, relying on several examples of cases in which individuals
acted as both public servants and private practitioners.8" The
Court even pointed out that at one time, the Attorney General of
the United States was a part time position.81 As a result, the
Court found that the common law naturally assumed that certain
individuals would act in mixed public and private capacities, and
that this distinction did not preclude a right to immunity for pub-
lic acts.82 Accordingly, the Court reversed, finding that the Ninth
Circuit's rationale in Delia was deeply flawed.83
IV. CONCLUSION
In Richardson, the Supreme Court indicated that a distinction
may exist between private lawyers acting for their own benefit
and those lawyers who act at the behest of a sovereign govern-
ment.' The Court suggested this narrow exception, even as it
closed the door of qualified immunity on virtually every other pri-
vate party.85 In the aftermath of Delia v. Rialto, the Supreme
Court took up this issue and finished what it started in Richard-
78. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1661-63; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010).
79. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407.
80. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1661-63.
81. Id. at 1663 (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792)).
82. Id. at 1663-64.
83. Id. at 1667-68.
84. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407.
85. Id. at 412.
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son. Specifically, the Court granted qualified immunity to outside
counsel, because to decide otherwise would not only be contrary to
the purpose of qualified immunity, but it would also have a nega-
tive practical impact on the way in which public sector lawyers
represent their clients. Accordingly, the Court properly overruled
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in Delia v. Rialto and
affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' position, granting
qualified immunity to outside counsel when it acts as an agent of
government.
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